Donate

EN
/

Join our email list

Israel at War – The Northern Front

The following is a transcript of Episode 102 of the For Heaven’s Sake Podcast. Note: This is a lightly edited transcript of a conversation, please excuse any errors.

Donniel: Hi, this is Donniel Hartman and Yossi Klein Halevi from the Shalom Hartman Institute, and this is For Heaven’s Sake, our special series, Israel at War, and today is Day 68. 

And today is a hard day. Two days ago, a graduate of the Hartman High School, Elia Yanovsky, was killed at the age of 24. And today, it was reported that 11 soldiers were killed in battles in Shuja’iyya. And the price of this war is heavy.

It’s interesting, Yossi, I don’t know if you sense this. I don’t remember as much resilience in Israeli society. We’re being we’re being hit. Israeli society is watching. I feel them watching. Like I feel them collecting the information and I feel them swallowing and saying onwards

Yossi: Absolutely. Not since the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, maybe not since the Yom Kippur War, has there been such stoicism and such a strong consensus that we need to fight this war until we achieve our goals. This is something new or renewed in the Israeli psyche, absolutely.

Donniel: And it’s not, we’re not belittling the casualties. And it’s not a general Jewish principle of every life is a whole world. In Israel, every soldier is our kid. It’s family, it’s personal. But, stoicism is a good term. Is it stoicism? Is it a sense of resoluteness?

You sense the way it is being discussed, but people are noticing. And the casualties are high, and they’re going to continue to be high, unfortunately. This stage of the battle in Gaza is a very, very difficult one. It’s one where we all have to remember. This is not a classic battle of forces meeting each other in the battlefield. Just doesn’t work that way. We would like it to, because our army is uniquely prepared for that. 

But to go into a densely populated area where the strategy of our enemy is not to show up and to meet us, because then they will lose, it’s for us to come. And then with booby-trapped buildings and with ambushes, and that’s what happened in Shuja’iyya, both happened. It’s this ongoing attempt to kill you with death by, what is it, a thousand cuts. It’s constant.

Yossi: Yeah, that hasn’t changed on their part. You know, we’ve been fighting Hamas on and off since 2008, since Operation Cast Lead. And each of those conflicts ended indecisively with a deep sense of malaise in Israel. 

First of all, the goals were not clearly defined, as they are now. Secondly, it really wasn’t clear to people whether we should be bringing Hamas down, is the goal just to stop the rocket fire. This is the first war since then where the goals have been clearly laid out and there’s overwhelming consensus in support of those goals.

Donniel: But you could have that consensus, Yossi. And it’s true, the goals are different. In the prior wars, the goal was, or the focus was, to somehow inhibit the fire of missiles. The danger was the missiles. And so the response to the missiles was Iron Dome. We had Iron Dome.

That’s what we had. And we had the Air Force and the target of the war was the missile launchers. And from time to time, then there was a target, the tunnels. But the idea of destroying Hamas is a completely different goal, no matter how justified. The question is whether it’s achievable. And the context for talking about this, and we’re going to have to talk about this more and more, because in Israeli society, I still think we’re talking about goals motivated by October 7th. 

October 7th demands that Hamas be destroyed. And it is a completely, it’s a different war with a different goal. And the context of Gaza is, and this war is, a good way to frame our theme for today, which is the Northern Front. Every day, every day missiles are fired from the Northern Front.

There is a war going on and we’re choosing not to call it a war. We’re choosing also we watch it. We know it’s there. We know close to a hundred thousand citizens of Israel have been evacuated from their hometowns. Kiryat Shmona, Shlomi and all the kibbutzim, they’re empty, and a larger size force is poised there, ready. The Air Force is bombing, and there’s this ongoing battle. And there’s a battle or a struggle or a question in Israeli society, what we should do. See, everybody knows that Hezbollah is just as untenable as Hamas’s. 

Yossi: Even more so, Donniel, even more so.

Donniel: Even more so. And the issue, let me just finish framing and then I want you to come in. And the issue is again, not the missiles. Our citizens have left their kibbutzim and towns because of a fear of another October 7th. It’s not a missile, how do we deal with the missile? It’s how do we deal with a murderous group of people who will not refrain from sending 50 groups of 30 or 50 all across to enter into various towns to slaughter people. The same danger is there with greater means, maybe with a little more to lose, that we hope. That whole equation is also being questioned. 

So the issue of the Northern Front is just sort of, it’s bubbling and I feel it’s bubbling higher and higher. Gallant said we should have attacked already. There’s discussion of should we go in, should we not go in? We have to talk about the Northern Front. 

What do you feel, when you talk about the Northern Front?

Yossi: You know, Lebanon has a very specific place in the Israeli imagination. It’s the place of our failure. It’s the one place where we lost a war. And it was a war that was supposed to be over in the summer of 1982, and it didn’t end till the hasty Israeli withdrawal under the cover of night in the year 2000.

So Lebanon sits on us. Lebanon is the place where we fought to uproot the PLO, and we received Hezbollah in its place. We’ve been dealing with the Lebanon border with missiles, katyushas, in those days, since the 1970s. And so Lebanon is a place that Israelis have not wanted to touch, to think about. And we had the brief war with Hezbollah in 2006, another inconclusive war. 

And we turned a blind eye while Hezbollah was rearming to an astonishing extent. Hezbollah today has something like 150,000 missiles and rockets. Many of those missiles are precision-guided. They can hit anywhere in the state of Israel. And we know what the next war is going to look like. Just in terms of the home front, this will be the worst, the worst conflict that the Israeli home front has experienced since 1948. No place will be safe in Israel. 

Now there’s a war, and if you’re not directly at the front, you can live a reasonably normal life. And that’s really the truth about how Israelis have been experiencing this so far. The moment we go to war with Hezbollah, normal life decisively ends in Israel, and we go into the shelters for the duration.

Donniel: So would you be willing, Yossi, to unilaterally start a war with Hezbollah in light of October 7th? Whether now, whether now or whether in a couple of months, do you think this is something that we—

Yossi: Yes, yes, yes. Absolutely, absolutely. If this war ends, even if we defeat, even if we defeat Hamas, if Hezbollah is sitting on the northern border, we will not have achieved our goals. 

I was in favor of leaving Gaza after October 7th, leaving it aside, and launching a preemptive strike on Hezbollah. Now, Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria, the Houthis, Iran, this is one united front. And the perception abroad is that this is a conflict between Israel and Hamas, or Israel and the Palestinians. But we experience this as a regional conflict. And by focusing on Hamas alone, we are not doing justice to the full dimensions of the threat that we’re facing. 

And look, you know the army and the government considered a preemptive strike against Hezbollah immediately after October 7th, and for whatever reason decide—and I understand, you know, we can all understand why the decision was made to bring down Hamas, but I think it was short-sighted. And if you look at what’s happening on the northern border every day, they’re testing and pushing, and we know the way these things begin, we don’t know how they end. The possibility of a deterioration is constant. 

And I have to tell you, Donniel, that I am as painful as it is to say this, I think we have no choice but to fight on a second front.

Donniel: Yossi, I completely concur with your analysis and motivation. But I couldn’t disagree more. I want to say something to our audience, and you know I don’t do pessimism. But my optimism is never disconnected from reality. I’m not naive. I look at reality and I ask how in the midst of that reality do I build life and move forward?

I want to say something that I feel very deeply doesn’t mean I’m right. I don’t think we could defeat Hezbollah. I think the lesson of the first and second war in Lebanon is that as powerful as Israel is, there are limits to our power. I’m not even sure we could defeat Hamas, but that’s for another day. 

And I think part of what we’re learning, maybe if we had three years and a self-propelled economy with the United Nations veto in our pocket, we could do it. You know, we could use our oil reserves and that, we don’t have to produce, we don’t have to trade, we don’t have to go to work.

The nature of these wars is very, very different. I don’t wanna go into detailed military analysis, which is beyond my pay grade, but it doesn’t stop me from having an opinion. But it doesn’t, you know, it’s like you don’t have to be a genius. You watch and you see. They don’t fight the way we want them to fight. And even with all the experience that we have, the experience that we have has shown us that we can prevail. They’re gonna constantly disappear, and bleed you to death. That’s what they do. 

So what did we do in 2006? We created such infrastructure damage in Lebanon to create some form of deterrence that the Lebanese would have a high degree of anger against Hezbollah that they shouldn’t just go on some adventure. 

But look at Hamas. Hamas knew that they weren’t going to destroy Israel, and their plan is to look at, yes, it wasn’t going to destroy Israel on October 7th. And they declare very openly, we are going to try to do a massacre of October 7th again, and again, and again. And what are the consequences to the civilians? They don’t care. 

Yossi: To their own civilians.

Donniel: To their own civilians, they don’t care. So they don’t care. So part of it, Yossi, I would ask you, and here, let’s talk about this. We know we can’t win. And when you’re mentioning regional conflict, we can’t engage in a regional conflict against Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, the Houthis alone. And I don’t see anybody in the world standing up. And at what time, Yossi, do we get up and recognize that there are limits to our power? And where do we make a distinction between what we deserve and what we can have? 

And we deserve that Hezbollah should disappear. We deserve that Hamas should be destroyed. We deserve that our citizens should be safe. I deserve it. I don’t want to mourn any more graduates of Hartman. I don’t want to mourn my friends’ kids and my friends. I don’t want to. I just don’t want to. I deserve it. You know, and we say this to ourselves over and over again. And we get very moved by it. It’s true. If Hezbollah and Hamas would put down its arms, there would be peace. But we don’t get that. 

So I’m wondering whether it’s, we have to begin to talk about goals, achievable goals. Where does reality, not need, factor into your statement? Cause you know as well as I do, I was in Lebanon, we remember the second war. In many ways, the second war in Lebanon was even more telling. We moved masses of forces in. And at the end, Hezbollah disappeared. They come out to kill us, and 10 soldiers a day is a number that Israel can’t sustain. And that’s what we had. And they could take and kill 10 soldiers a day forever, wherever they’re hiding. They’re not going to meet us. And we march by, and the minute we rest, or the minute we go near a building, the roadside bomb, we know it. 

A huge America experienced this in Afghanistan. How many wars will it take till we know that conventional armies, no matter how much they train, have a profound difficulty fighting non-conventional disproportionate wars? And I don’t say that we have another solution, but I would talk about war very differently, Yossi.

Yossi: I think we have a different question that we need to ask ourselves, which is how much of our power are we prepared to unleash? Because in all of our asymmetrical wars, we pulled our punches. Understandably, we didn’t use the full force at our disposal. If you’re using Lebanon 2006, I think that’s a classic example. We used really very little, even of our air power.

The army has been saying now for the last few years, trying to prepare the Israeli public for what they felt was an inevitable conflict in the north, that when—not if, but when—we go to war again with Hezbollah, we will give the residents of southern Lebanon 24 hours to leave. Not three weeks, as it played out in Gaza. 24 hours. And then we will move all of our force against Hezbollah. 

Now, if we don’t think we can win, we should not have gone into Gaza. I think we can win. I think the army is fighting in ways that surprise many of us. The quality of the strategy, to say nothing of the morale, is something we haven’t seen in a long time here. 

Now, it’s true, we’re fighting a new round of this long asymmetrical war, but this is different, this is, because, again, this is the first time that we have set as our goal, first the destruction of Hamas, and if we go to war against Hezbollah, the goal will be the destruction of Hezbollah. Is it possible? Is it possible? I have to believe that it is.

Donniel: Yossi, Yossi, I hear you and I don’t want to get into a factual debate, because they’re never meaningful. And everybody, we know this. Everybody has the facts that mirror their opinions.

I think Israel is using all of its power in Gaza. I don’t think Israel’s holding back anything. I think in 2006, Israel didn’t hold back anything. It wiped out I don’t know what percentage of the infrastructure of Lebanon. I’m being reminded of, on October 7th, but not just October 7th. On today, December 13th. 

By the way, I just looked at the calendar. December 13th, 1971 was the day that my family made Aliyah. So in the middle of Hanukkah.

Yossi: Happy anniversary. 

Donniel: Happy anniversary. 

Yossi: No regrets? No regrets, Donniel? 

Donniel: 50, what is it? Oh, nah, no regrets. I couldn’t imagine a life anywhere near as meaningful and as important and as also joyful with all said and done. Israel is a glorious place to live, but part of it is having to deal with levels of difficulty and trauma which aren’t a part of American or Canadian Jewish life.

Yossi: And yet, and you know, part of this moment, I think, in appreciating being an Israeli, is there’s nowhere I would rather be right now than here. It would be unbearable for me not to be here. It’s unbearable to be here too. But to be anywhere else, for a prolonged period, I would find it excruciating.

Donniel: Excruciating. Very often when I meet Jews from North America, as paradoxical as it is, those who are great lovers of Israel have a more difficult time. They’re distanced, they don’t know what to do. 

But despite that, I think part of what, you know, I just noticed that this is my 52nd anniversary of my aliyah, that despite it all, I feel that the way we have to live is we need to accept reality and come up with plans in light of that reality and not to try to redefine reality to fit our will. I don’t think in the long run that’s possible and I think the northern front is, in many ways, the test case.

Let’s, the language Yossi and I’m saying, you didn’t use it. because you didn’t say it lightly. But you hear generals or people say, yes, let’s take out Hezbollah. I love slash hate take out Hezbollah. Yes, just take them out. 

We’ll give, even your statement, we’ll give you 24 hours. You think you could on your own decide how many hours you’re giving somebody? You think on your own you’re going to say and then you’re going to start bombing and there aren’t going to be consequences? But whatever it is, there are limits. Israel is about survival, but we recognize the limits of our power

Yossi: Okay, Donniel, okay.

Donniel: And maybe, and I hear, I know you’re, I know, I’m letting, I’m letting you, I’m letting you, just give me one more second, because I’m getting to say, there, it’s, that’s, that’s what we have to live with. No one promises you a rose garden. Israel is not the garden of Eden. It’s certainly not the land of milk and honey. It isn’t. It’s our home. For better or for worse, it’s our home. 

But in that home, danger is an inherent part of what we have to live with. It’s impossible. And so we develop systems of denial. But I would rather have systems of denial than systems of military fantasy. And you didn’t say it, but this flippant, let’s wipe out Hezbollah as if we haven’t been there, as if we don’t know that Hezbollah is the largest non-governmental army in the world, that they fight non-conventional or, they force you into an asymmetrical war in which their ability to suffer casualties is tenfold yours, and they never show up unless it is to ambush you. 

We have learned a lot and the world has learned a lot, and I know it’s hard, and in America or Canada, you have to deal with dangers that are 10, 12,000 miles away. We have to deal with this on our doorstep. And that’s our cross to bear. And that’s it. 

And in the midst of that, we will thrive with periodical catastrophes. But I don’t know if we have more than that. I’m afraid of the greater catastrophe of forgetting the limitations of what our power is, no matter how immense it is.

Yossi: So, to use a loaded word, the context has changed. And the context today, first of all, in our war with Gaza, October 7th changed the terms of the conflict. That’s why the goal was presented differently by the army this time, and why the public virtually wall-to-wall, from left to right embrace the goal of bringing down Hamas. You don’t hear people saying, can we do it? We have to do it. We have to do it because October 7th created an imperative that didn’t exist before. 

Now imagine, Donniel, if we go to war with Hezbollah and they unleash what the army estimates will be four or five thousand rockets and missiles against the home front a day, devastating large parts of Israel.

The Iron Dome is adequate to deal with the threat from Hamas. It is pathetically inadequate to deal with the threat from Hezbollah, which means that our homefront is going to risk devastation. How will that change the context? How will that change the way we view, not whether we can, but whether we have a choice. 

In other words, whether we can or not is an open question, and you’re right, including in Gaza. But what I sense the answer of the Israeli public is now and will be in Lebanon is we’re not going to allow ourselves to ask that question, whether we can, because we must.

Donniel: I could, let me clarify, if and when Hezbollah launches 5,000 missiles, of course we have to attack. And when that happens, all hell breaks loose and our air force begins to bomb in, in measures that are, in amounts that are almost immeasurable. And we try to take out as quickly as possible and as much as possible of their missile capability. When they attack, we have no choice, just like Gaza. On October 7th, we had no choice. 

There is a difference, however, between fighting a war after you’re attacked, and it’s easier to wait for that than to do a preemptive one under the notion that you could just take care of things. If and when Hezbollah attacks, we have to respond. 

Now, we are pretending that they haven’t yet attacked. It’s still, you know, five missiles a day, 99% of them are either, fall in open territory or we take down with Iron Dome. When Armageddon comes, Israel’s ready. But I think when we do that, there’s a difference between responding at that day and the military force and means at your disposal, and the context of a world being involved as well, and us deciding to do it on our own. 

And so that’s when we talk about the Northern Front, I have no problem fighting a war of ein breirah, of no choice. It’s when we somehow forget the limitations of our power and declare that now, right now, because Hezbollah has the capability of attacking us, this is now the day, what was it, June, what, before the Six Day War? This is a legitimate preemptive act. That’s where I recommend that we have much more caution and we remember. We remember the limitations of our power. 

Last word, Yossi, to you, my friend.

Yossi: You use the word Armageddon, and I would adopt that word in relation to October 7th. I feel that Hezbollah and Iran, whether they were directly implicated in the planning or not, were part of the October 7th assault. And so our response for me is not confined to Hamas. 

I’m looking at the arc of the radical Shiite front, as essentially a single enemy that Israel is facing. And this is a moveable front, and right now we’re fighting Hamas. We could just as easily have begun with Hezbollah, and we may very well have to end with Hezbollah.

Donniel: The Northern Front is a front that is haunting Israeli society. It haunts us at least since 1982. It has never been the place of simple victory. In light of the last 68 days, how we think about our power, how we engage in war, and when we engage in war is a new conversation on a deeper level that Israeli society is now struggling with. What can we do on our own? And what is really a larger global war in which other parts of the world also have to engage in this question? 

All of these are today on day 68 as we mourn 11 soldiers. This is, it’s heavy on our consciousness. We have to watch it. And we have to figure out what we want to do. And we’re never going to know.

This is For Heaven’s Sake, Israel at War, Day 68. Yossi, it’s invaluable just thinking through these questions and these issues with you. You should be well. And may Am Yisrael be well.

Yossi: The same. Thank you, Daniel.

You can now sponsor an episode of For Heaven’s Sake — Israel at War. The link to donate can be found in the show notes or shalomhartman.org/forheavenssake. We will acknowledge your gift in a future episode. For more ideas from the Shalom Hartman Institute about what’s unfolding right now, sign up for our newsletter in the show notes or visit shalomhartman.org/israelatwar.  

More on
Search
FOLLOW HARTMAN INSTITUTE
Join our email list

SEND BY EMAIL

The End of Policy Substance in Israel Politics