The following is a transcript of Episode 82 of the For Heaven’s Sake Podcast. Note: This is a lightly edited transcript of a conversation, please excuse any errors.

Donniel: My name is Donniel Hartman and I’m the president of the Shalom Hartman Institute. And this is For Heaven’s Sake, a podcast on the Hartman Institute’s iEngage project. Major support for For Heaven’s Sake comes from the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation. Our theme for today is, are the Saudis the game changers? The status quo breakers?

In each edition of For Heaven’s Sake, Yossi Klein Halevi, senior research fellow at the Institute here in Jerusalem, Elana Stein-Hain, head of the Beit Midrash of Shalom Hartman Institute North America and senior fellow, and myself discuss a current issue central to Israel and the Jewish world. And then Elana adds and explores how classical Jewish sources can enrich our understanding of the issue. Let’s begin. 

The two-state solution is dead. And the current status quo on the conflict with the Palestinians is etched in stone, with neither side willing or able to break it. That sentence is the conventional wisdom in Israel, or at least for the last 18 years, since the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. But is this necessarily the case? Is a Saudi-Israel peace deal a potential status quo breaker and changer? 

Persistent reports indicate that the Saudis, who seem invested in exploring normalizing relations with Israel for their own reasons, are tying a peace agreement to substantial Israeli concessions on the Palestinian front. At the very least, a settlement frees, along with some renewed Israeli commitment to a two-state outcome, possibly even a demand for the implementation of some form of a two-state deal. Every day brings with it conflicting reports as to what exactly the Saudis are demanding.

Given the presence of far-right parties adamantly opposed to a Palestinian state, or even any meaningful concessions to the Palestinians short of a state, it seems certain that this government will not be able to reach an agreement with the Saudis. Will Prime Minister Netanyahu, for whom peace with Arab neighbors was always your strategic goal, towards which he was willing to compromise, consider forming a new coalition? 

Especially at this time, given the beating Israel’s reputation and standing has undergone as a result of the judicial reform process, not to speak of Netanyahu’s legacy. Will this be a catalyst? A Saudi deal would go a long way to salvaging both. But is it really an option? How will the parties in the coalition react if it is pursued and, conversely, how will the Israeli public react if its own government turns out to be a major obstacle to the deal? 

As always, an interesting time. Never seems to get boring here. With a new year, a new conversation. Yossi, do you see or do you see this as a game changer and what do you see are the major obstacles confronting this moment?

Yossi: So, first of all I have to tell you, I love this topic. And I’m so relieved that we’re talking about something potentially uplifting, and yes, I do believe this is a game changer, and I’ll try to explain why in a moment. 

But just for a moment if we could linger on this extraordinary opportunity, in that, you know, for the last year, we’ve gotten used to the inconceivable in Israel in such overwhelmingly negative and depressing ways. Who could have imagined a Kahanist as head of, you know, in control of the Israeli police, etc., everything we’ve been talking about.

Donniel: But Yossi, just for the record, I was the opti- I still maintain my optimist.

Yossi: You do, you do. And now I would never have imagined that my hope for Israel would be coming from outside the country, let alone from Saudi Arabia, which was, until not that long ago, our most implacable enemy. It was the center of world antisemitism.

And, you know, one of the things that’s so interesting and also a little bit maddening about Israeli reality is that the inconceivable becomes the routine much too quickly. And I just want to linger on the inconceivable nature of this moment, for just a moment, that’s all. And to appreciate it, to appreciate this.

Donniel: So let’s take a pause, because I think you’re right. It’s real, let’s just take a breather. We’re not talking about reform. It’s like, here it is. There is something unbelievable. I think it, just pointing it out is a dayenu moment, Yossi, and I thank you for that.

Yossi: Yeah, and you know, let’s take it a step further and contrast this opportunity with the Saudi peace plan of 2002, which was rejected, I think, justifiably by every Israeli government, left, right and center as a non-starter. That plan was presented to Israel as a diktat. Take it or leave it. Here is the plan signed on by 22 Arab states and here is one Israel and you either withdraw to the 67 borders except refugee return of 1948, etc. or there is no deal. And that’s not how this deal is being framed.

The Saudis aren’t even asking us to create a Palestinian state as a prerequisite for a deal. What are they asking? Just don’t do anything too crazy. Don’t do anything that’s going to foreclose the option on a two-state solution. And if we’re talking about the inconceivable, let me add one negative inconceivable here, which was, who could have imagined that the Saudis would be knocking on our door and we would have the most anti-Arab government in our history, and we were wondering, are we capable of making peace with the Saudis? So it’s an inconceivable moment in so many different ways.

Donniel: Very interesting. You know, when I look at this moment, part of our self-understanding of ourselves, the story we tell of ourselves about ourselves, is that we’re always open to peace. That is such a critical part of the Israeli Jewish narrative. We always offered and they said no and like, and all our advocacy experts will go back from the partition plan in 47 to every single moment, we always say yes.

Now, it still might come that we will say yes at this moment too, but that it’s even conceivable that we won’t is an indication of something very powerful and I think it’s really important to put on the table the two different sources of the no. 

Since the second Intifada, the majority of Israelis began to see our greatest existential threat being a Palestinian state. Seeing Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Aza, moving to Judea and Samaria. Like that’s just for most Israelis, the two-state solution became an existential threat. I might, you know, after 2005, and it was removed from the conversation. 

So question A is would a Saudi deal change that core dynamic? Because at the end of the day, the Palestinian authority is not in control of Judea and Samaria or the West Bank. And so would the Saudi deal be able to change the security equation. It changes the global security issue with Iran. That’s true. As Tal Becker often would say, putting Israel in the Sunni camp. We’re Sunnis in the Middle East.

Yossi: We’re a Jewish Sunni state.

Donniel: We’re a Jewish Sunni, so we’re part of the Sunni coalition against the Shiites. So, but on an immediate level, regarding the safety of our children, our families, our roads, a two-state solution is very scary. Since the second Intifada and even more, after the withdrawal, and that led to an Israeli center and left who don’t talk about it, and an Israeli right who are even more ideological about the rejection of it. 

There used to be this notion that the debate is between, do you care about Kedushat Yisrael or Kedushat Haaretz? Do you care about the sanctity of Israel or the sanctity of the land? And the majority of Israelis on the right said, my right-wing position grows out of the sanctity of Israel. I care about security, precisely because I care about security. We can’t do any moves in Judea and Samaria. I’m very frightened of moves in Judea and Samaria. 

So that’s one group and the question is how the Saudi deal and I really like your articulation, it’s no longer, take it or leave it, like a power play. I am the powerful one, poor Israel, you will, you’ll take my crumbs. Like how does this deal, how do we deal with Israelis’ serious security needs because, and, a little bracket I want to come back to, that nobody is going into this deal in order to resolve the injustices of the Palestinian people. That’s not part of, I don’t think it’s the Saudi impetus and it’s certainly not Israeli Jewish impetus. It’s a byproduct of it, but it’s not, that’s not what’s motivating. 

So for the anti-two states, or even for those who haven’t talked about it in the center, how would this change the equation on a security level, has to be talked about

Yossi: Yeah, yeah, I think that’s crucial.

Donniel: And here, it’s really important also to see the very significant difference between Israeli liberals and North American liberals, because the majority of Israeli liberals are still very nervous about the security consequences of a two-state solution. The majority of American and Canadian liberals and world Jewry, now we’re always going to say Australia and England and other places, are less concerned, and the moral injustices of occupying another people is something that has to end right away. 

And so even though we share liberal values, there’s a difference between them. So how will Israeli liberals on the center and on the right, and even the center-left, deal with the security? How does, the security issue is one issue. But there’s another critical issue at play, especially in this coalition. 

The Haredim will have no problem. They’re not Eretz Yisrael’s holiness of the land of Israel people, even though they’re invested now in settlements in order to solve the natural growth of their communities. But the right, which is so-called in one coalition, in fact has the biggest group, are really worried about the security, and there’s another segment for whom the issue is not security, the issue is the holiness of the land and a larger messianic process which we are in right now. 

And that messianic process which started with the founding of Israel and was accelerated after ‘67 is coming close to a culmination with God returning to history and redeeming the Jewish people. But the condition is that we hold on to all of the land of Israel. And as a result, any realpolitik argument is irrelevant because for them, realpolitik is divine politics. Like there is no distinction. And so you’re facing here a fissure in the right between one which would consider it if we could seriously talk about Israel’s security needs and another for whom this is a core security danger because it’s moving the coming of the Messiah. And this coalition is made up of both groups. 

Now, Netanyahu always is never part of the second. He was always part of the first. And he himself always saw these types of moves as being in Israel’s strategic interest. The Y agreement, at the end, he gave up annexing area C in order to put the Abraham Accords. So, Netanyahu himself, I see him as, as on this issue, more flexible.

But it’ll be interesting to see how the two sides who are threatened, the security people and the messianists, could handle it. And ultimately, as I said beforehand, it probably could only move forward with a different coalition, which would be a whole other issue altogether. How does that sound to you, Yos?

Yossi: So uh, let me respond to the three points, really, that you’ve brought up. The first is the security implications of a Saudi deal. The second is how the Israeli public is likely to respond to different parts of the public and in particular of this government. And finally, Netanyahu. And let the record show, Donniel, that you brought up Netanyahu first. So I will have to say what I think of Netanyahu. And let’s begin with the first point. 

In the past, the Arab world and in particular the Saudis acted as a force encouraging Palestinian rejectionism of any peace agreement that was put on the table. And by the way, I think that one of the other interesting differences between centrist Israeli liberals and the left in general, is how we perceive the history of peacemaking here, because centrists believe that the conventional or mainstream Israeli understanding of that history vindicates us, largely vindicates us, and the left does not. I think that’s a really important background to this question, and it’s certainly what liberal Israelis are bringing to the table here, which is to say we’re not coming to a deal with the Saudis with this, with a sense of guilt for the occupation, but certainly with a sense of opportunity in the hope of ending the occupation, if we can do it safely. 

And what’s changed, and it’s a sea change, is that much of the Arab world, led again by the Saudis, are now acting as a restraint on Palestinian rejectionism. And I would go even one step further and say that if this deal comes through, Israel will have much of the Arab world as allies. Now imagine that, just saying Israel’s Arab allies is itself almost surreal for those of us who grew up with 1960s and ‘73 and ‘82 and that whole dismal history of the Arab world versus the lone Jewish state. That’s over. And peace with the Saudis would effectively mean the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its transformation into the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and with the substantial addition of the Iranian or Shiite-Israeli conflict. 

Now, that conflict is not going away, but it is being substantially reduced from our perspective. It is not inconceivable to imagine security arrangements in the territories for a Palestinian state that Israel can negotiate not only with the Palestinians, but with our Arab allies. I could imagine some kind of a pan-Arab military force working with the IDF, working with the Palestinians to ensure that the West Bank doesn’t turn into Gaza. In other words, the Saudi option opens up previously inconceivable horizons for us.

Then the next question is how would the Israeli public react to this? My sense and what at least the Israel that I think I know is that there would be a majority, I can no longer say a strong majority, Donniel, as I once would have said I think that strong majority has been eroded. But there certainly would be a majority that would opt for peace and give up the dream of the complete land of Israel. 

Now the minority that would not would be extremely dangerous. And that minority is now holding this government in a chokehold. And that’s what’s changed, is that what was once a fringe or at least an insignificant minority which couldn’t stop, for example, the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, that minority is now sitting in the heart of the government and the levers of the defense establishment.

Donniel: Like, it’s very interesting. And I wanna, I, Elana, I wanna ask you a question in light of something that Yossi said. I want your take on this. You know, as you’re saying at the end, we’re in such a strange time that who would have thought that the consequences of voting in this manner could undermine a potential radical transformation of the whole Middle East?

Yossi: You mean voting for this government. Right.

Donniel: Like, like who did everybody who voted or those who voted, not the Likud, because the Likud very often has, has always proven itself in my mind to be more flexible in this than they get credit for. But there’s consequences, you know, to say that Likud and Smotrich are the same is just not true. You know, Smotrich has an ideology of undermining the Palestinian Authority so that there is a constant conflict, so that we will avoid even the possibility of any negotiations which could hinder a messianic process. But Elana, Yossi said the following, he said, there’s going to be now Israel and our Arab allies. And it’s really interesting, in Israel, nobody’s bothered by Saudi Arabia, or we’re actually not bothered by the moral practices of the Emirates. 

And it’s like, can Liberal Jews, in your estimation, and I’m not categorizing you. Liberal Americans, I don’t know where they’re gonna go on this, I can’t say, but could liberal Jews accept that, in your mind, that we have allies? Imperfect or problematic?

In Israel, we don’t, it’s interesting, we might have standards of ethics about ourselves, but we sort of assume that in the Middle East, we’re talking about people with other standards and we’re willing to sit, to be in bed with them. Could American Jewish population accept Arab allies given the moral standards of these of these allies?

Elana: Well, so I think it’s really interesting. You know, it sounds like, in every corner of this triangle, there’s something that sort of gives people pause. For the Israelis, it’s the question of what are the concessions that we’re going to need to make for the Palestinians and will that impact our security? For the Saudis, it’s, do we want to make this deal with a Democrat who probably won’t give us as much as Trump would have given us? That’s a real thing. 

Donniel: Or will give us.

Elana: Or will give us. And for the Americans, it’s, what do you mean, the Saudis? That’s, it’s like the Emirates, it’s like, eh, do we care about them? Do we not? But the Saudis, we don’t like the Saudis right now. We think they’re highly immoral and whether it’s the murder of Khashoggi or it’s repression of women, there’s lots and lots of reasons. 

I mean, Biden himself called Saudi Arabia a pariah state pretty recently. So it’s kind of interesting to see. Look, I think the question is, what is our tolerance? And this is what I’m going to talk about when we get to the Torah conversation. What is our tolerance for dirty hands, for moral impurity? 

I mean, people must know that there was a letter sent to Biden this week by some 75 American Jewish leaders that basically said, make the two-state solution part of this. Make the two-state solution part of this. And it’s interesting who signed it and who wouldn’t sign it, right? Because they don’t want to be in bed with the Saudis to begin with. So why are we, you know, like, I think it’s a real test of tolerance. And by the way, within the Democratic Party too, it’s a real test of tolerance, right? It’s not just American Jews. Are they gonna let Biden do this?

Donniel: So it’ll be a real edge. It’ll be an interesting moral dilemma to add to the multiple ones. One thing I wanted to put forth, thank you, I’ll use this opportunity, because I always like breaking the lines and the stereotypes. And Yossi, I want to know what you feel about this. I don’t think the Saudis are just going to tolerate some general cessation of settlement building and a declaration that we’re going to be nice in the future. I think they know it’s a game-changer for us. 

It’s also, by the way, they have their own game-changing. It’s not that they’re lovers of the Palestinian rights. For them, there’s a whole significant question of where they align themselves. Do they align themselves with China and Iran? Where do they go? And can they ever align themselves? And if they do that alliance, does that threaten them in ways? And is America better for them? So they have a whole story which goes beyond my pay grade to, you know, I read about it, but I won’t talk about it. Let’s just reference the idea. 

But just as an inherent part, they’re going to insist on more. And in all probability Israel is going to be faced with, let’s put onto our podcast, are you going to accept some form of the Trump peace plan? And that itself is an interesting compromise. Like, could we Jews have Arab allies? Could we talk about a plan and be associated with Trump, because, as I’ve said many times in my mind, this was one of the more helpful plans put forth in the in really in for years and decades. 

And the Trump peace plan for our audience basically says, create a Palestinian state in Areas A and B, Area C where there are Jewish settlements, 30%, leave it for now, and give the Palestinians some foothold as a capital in Jerusalem. This was the deal that Trump and Jared Kushner put forth. But because liberal Jews in America and liberals in America saw this as a Trump initiative, by definition it wasn’t something to be listened to. And then as a result, Mahmoud Abbas says, I’m not even relating to you, and it was off the table. 

Some form of something, not a massive territorial realignment of settlements, but something substantive like this is going to be put on the table. How does something like that, could something like that get through the Israeli population? Would something like that be sufficient to create, to move Benny Gantz to join a coalition?

Could Netanyahu be trusted? Whatever his motivations are, and you didn’t get to it, you have suspicions as to his motivations. But whatever they are, will there be an alignment? Because it’s not going to be, nothing is ever simple. It’s not going to be we’re going to change Israel’s whole alignment in the Arab world just by some little statement or a declaration in English, not in Hebrew, of our intent to pursue peace. Where do you see this falling out, Yos?

Yossi: I think it’s an interesting question about the Trump plan as being the basis of the Saudi overture. I think one needs to preface that by noting that the Saudis really don’t care about the Palestinians. And anyone that I’ve spoken to who knows the Saudis well makes that point very strongly. 

When you speak to the Saudis, and I personally haven’t, but people who have say that the Saudis carry a great deal of resentment toward the Palestinian national movement. They feel used and underappreciated, which by the way, I was in Morocco about half a year ago and I heard similar sentiments from people in government. There’s a great deal of anger at how the Palestinian national movement used and misused the Arab world’s support. And so there isn’t a great deal of love and deep solidarity with the Palestinians. I think that’s important to understand. 

But the last 70 years have created a kind of a self-fulfilling dynamic where Arab leaders still have to pay lip service to the Palestinian cause. You can’t be seen as betraying the Palestinians. And so they are going to have to put something substantial on the table. My sense is, and again, I don’t know anything more than what I read, but I don’t see that the Saudis are demanding a Palestinian state as a prerequisite for a deal. The Trump plan puts a different spin on it because it is a version of a Palestinian state, which even parts of the settlement movement said they could live with.

Now, most of the settlement movement rejected it out of hand. But there were some voices that said, well, let’s take a look at this. After all, the Trump plan allows all settlements to remain in place. 

Donniel: And in the Likud it was very popular. If you didn’t have a settlement focus alone, it dealt with all of Israel’s security needs.

Yossi: Yes, yeah, so I think that there is, if that becomes the basis, it will only further exacerbate the divide within this government because the far right, obviously, we’ll see this as a declaration of war rather than peace. 

But you know, Donniel, I need to qualify one point you made, which is that the Likud in the past was very much the party that you characterized. It was a party that was hard-line, but pragmatic, and certainly would not say no to a peace agreement with the Saudis, and even under the conditions of a truncated Palestinian peace, which is what the Trump plan would result in. 

But Netanyahu’s sin, his political sin, his sin against the Israeli political system is twofold. First of all, he legitimized the far right and brought them into the heart of power. And secondly, he transformed the Likud, or large parts of the into a hard right party, some of whose elements would be very comfortable in Ben-Gvir’s party. 

And whether we’re talking about a quarter of the Likud, or I think it’s more like a third of the Likud today, that creates a further complication. And I don’t see any way that Netanyahu can bring even his own Likud into the Saudi deal that you’re describing. Would he bring in Benny Gantz in exchange for the far right? I think Netanyahu goes to sleep every night asking himself the following question: Prison? Legacy? Legacy? Prison? And I don’t think he has an answer.

And that in itself is an extraordinary indictment because what it really means is that the old Netanyahu, who I believe would have unquestionably come out on the side of the national interest, especially given what this would mean for his legacy, today, I think we’re dealing with a debased man, a man who has become the sum total of his flaws. Netanyahu was always a flawed man, all politicians are. He perhaps more so, but he also had extraordinary qualities. He also was, could have been, one of our greatest leaders.

And what he’s done in the last year is systematically destroy his own legacy and revealed a Netanyahu that we didn’t know before. So I don’t know. I don’t know who we’re dealing with. I don’t know what its calculations will be.

Donniel: So Yossi, before we turn to Elana, allow me to be optimistic again. It’s not just about optimism regarding the reform. If this is navigated, there’s again huge fascinating potential. I think potential to change the status quo on one of the most significant cancers in Israeli society. And that’s the occupation of another people. And it’s not gonna be perfect. And a Palestinian authority who wouldn’t accept things with the Saudis and is going to be forced to accept certain things. 

Now one of the things that, and here I want to go to your sensitivity, it’s very, very tough to count on Netanyahu’s good inclinations. But when you have good inclinations together with self-interest, here, Netanyahu’s self-interest to reclaim some legacy, to reactivate Israel’s whole public image. You know, the economic crisis, we’re beginning to feel it’s all public image. What are we? It has the, this core basis of Israel’s economic structure hasn’t changed, but investments are going down, etc. It couldliterally take all the damage that the reform brought out and just wipe it out. All of a sudden we’re moving, we’re innovative, we’re taking risks for the sake of, we’re everything you want. It is, I don’t think that Netanyahu, both for his who he is and I believe he truly cares about Israel, plus his self-interest in which he cares about his legacy, I don’t think he’ll be able to turn it down. The problem is whether a Benny Gantz would ever agree to join after what he did to him. 

I have a feeling that you might see something very interesting. I would just say to our audience, watch. Keep your eyes out. We raise this issue today because there’s something changing in the equation. There’s something, I always like hope, but this is not Pollyannaish utopian hope. There’s something being discussed right now, being discussed with Netanyahu and Biden, being discussed at every level. And it might be a significant game changer, not just vis-a-vis Israel and the Middle East and our Arab neighbors, but vis-a-vis Israel’s whole political and moral identity, and its ability to again reclaim certain liberal Zionist positions. 

Yossi, last word and then we’ll turn to Elana.

Yossi: The conflict abroad is usually perceived through the lens of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but Israelis perceive this as a regional conflict, and a regional conflict requires a regional solution. And what’s so exciting for me about the possibility of peace with the Saudis is that it opens the way to solving the regional conflict and then reducing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to its actual dimensions.

Donniel: Beautiful, thank you. Let’s take a short break, and then Elana will join us again.

Elana, this international politics, dirty hands, peace with people who are, what’s the term, nefarious? Is that, did I say it right? 

Elana: I think nefarious is a good term here. Pretty nefarious.

Donniel: It’s a good term. Potential, game-changing, all of the above. 

Elana: Okay, so first of all, I just want to say it was so nice, Yossi, to hear you so optimistic at the beginning of this podcast. When you talked about the possibilities, it was absolutely gorgeous. And I just want to say that I really, really hope that at least some of what you talked about will come to fruition this year. 

You know, we’re at the beginning of the year, and we don’t know, God willing, exactly. We really don’t know. 

Yossi: Inshallah, Inshallah.

Elana:  And it was really beautiful to have that moment, even as the realism, the realism is here. You know, the realism is here. Look, I think a lot about the question of whether the morality of politics has to be the same as the standard for individual morality.

And I think it’s interesting to note that in rabbinic Judaism, and just bear with me for a minute because I’ll get to where this actually brings together right and left in an interesting way. In rabbinic Judaism, there’s a big conversation about what your motivations are for doing things and what you’re allowed to do based on your motivation. 

So I’m going to stake out three positions that you find in rabbinic literature about this. The first position found in the Babylonian Talmud, Brachot 17A comes from Rava, and he says, “Anyone who does something, even something good for the wrong reasons, like for ulterior motives, better that they’re not created even, better that they wouldn’t be created.”

Meaning it’s such a corruption. You’re doing the right thing, but you’re doing it for ulterior motives. It’s so gross. It’s such a corruption. I wish you wouldn’t have been born. Right? That’s a pretty hard-line approach. 

Then you have a different approach in the Talmud in Nazir, that tractate, 23b. And it’s the name of Rabbi Yehuda, who’s saying it in the name of his teacher, Rav. “A person should always be involved in Torah and mitzvot, in study and commandments, even for ulterior motives. Because those ulterior motives will bring you ultimately to good motives.” Meaning get into the habit of doing the right thing. Do the right thing, eventually the right motives will come. So that’s like a nice mezzo position, right? It’s a nice middle position, but it still wants you to have the right motives. 

And then there’s a position that I think is just wild. It’s just wild. It’s on that same folio in Nazir, that same page, and it’s attributed to Rav Nahman the son of Yitzchak, which is, “Doing a sin, but for the right reason, is better than doing something good for the wrong reason.” Do a sin for the right reason. 

And I look at these three and I say to myself, what is this sin for the right reason thing? And I start to look at where these things are applied. And the place where doing a sin for the right reason comes up is in situations where the right reason is saving everybody. And so what I think is really interesting here is this position, and it’s such a dangerous position, I know it’s a dangerous position, of sometimes you have to sin for the right reasons, in this situation, I actually think brings together hardline right Israelis and hardline left Americans. Weird way, okay? Work with me here. 

Right Israelis. The concessions that they’re going to be asked for, sinful, transgressive, we can’t do this. But they have to do it to ensure Israel’s safety. They have to do it. And by the way, even I think some Messianists might go in that direction. They have to do it. I don’t know. It’s a sin, but it’s a sin for something good. 

Left Americans. What’s the goal here? Breaking the status quo, reviving some possibility of ending an occupation, right? Do we have to work with this terrible nefarious regime and become friends with them, become normalized with them in order to do it? Yeah, is that sinful? Yeah, it’s sinful. It’s bad. We don’t wanna do it, but we’ll do it for the ultimate goal of something good, which is getting to some reconciliation between the two. 

And I just think it’s interesting because we live in a world where there’s a lot of purity tests. There’s a lot of prove what you think. And I don’t just think it’s posturing, God forbid. I really don’t. I think people really believe what they believe. But I think what we’re looking at is a moment in politics where people have to be able to say to themselves, I have to overcome things that I usually would regard as a problem in order to get to something bigger, more substantial, and more existential. Right? So that’s where I’m sitting here.

Donniel: You know, Elana, I really like, you know, as you were talking, sometimes as an Israeli, I feel that there’s a maximalist type of ideology, which towards certain issues that we face, that I know we just can’t do. There’s no, Israelis aren’t going to be there. It’s not conceivable. From 6,000 to 10,000 miles away, the problems don’t seem to be as acute. 

But here, there’s certain, how do we have a conversation about ending the occupation, which is not the final, end-all perfect justice, everything removal of settlements, it’s just not going to be, you know, my own affinity with the Trump peace plan was precisely because I felt as you were saying, it’s a, I don’t know if I would call it a, an averah. What did you use the term? How did you,

Elana: A transgression, yeah.

Donniel: I don’t know if it was a transgression, but there was a sense in which practicality. How do we take steps forward even when they’re not perfect? And I love imperfect steps forward. And maybe this could be a new moment. Even, you know, we’re always working, and a big part of our podcast is about the relationship between Israelis, Jews, and North American Jews, and Jews around the world, that there’s something about embracing imperfect solutions. 

And you know, it could die if a certain group says, if Israel doesn’t now sign a complete total withdrawal from all of the, don’t, Saudis, don’t give in. Okay, so you won and then what did you do? Nothing. Then we’re left back with the more imperfect status quo. So maybe as you’re pointing, there’s a potential for growth on a lot of sides. 

But realism, realism could sometimes be seen as doing the right thing for a wrong reason or, because the realism could be the wrong reason, or a sin for the good reason. But there might be some interesting moves here.

Elana: Yeah. Yeah, I just I think it’s very dangerous. I know that it’s difficult to talk about, you know, what imperfections are you willing to live with or what risks are you willing to live with or what moral problems are you willing to live with. I realize this is the beginning of a conversation, not the end, but the idea that the only way you can do it, whether it’s reconciliation with the Palestinians or whether it’s figuring out normalization in the region, is if all the moral aspects are perfect and everyone’s motives are perfect, it’s not happening. It’s not going to happen. 

I mean Mahmoud Abbas literally just justified the Holocaust a few weeks ago. Like, you know what I’m saying? That’s not what we’re talking about here. We’re talking about interests that hopefully serve our values.

Donniel: The place of interest and liberal values is very interesting, and accepting that imperfection that you’re pointing to is maybe where, is the next stage. You know, maybe the messianic is where there are no other. There’s a liberal messianic just as much as there’s the settlement messianic that we have to avoid for. I really appreciate it.

Elana: Oh for sure.

Donniel: For Heaven’s Sake is a product of the Shalom Hartman Institute. It was edited by Gareth Hobbs at Silver Sound NYC. Our executive producer is Maital Friedman. M. Louis Gordon is our production manager, and our music is provided by Socalled.

Major funding for For Heaven’s Sake is provided by the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation of Los Angeles because of our shared commitment to strengthening the connection between Jews in North America and Israel. 

Transcripts of our show are now available on our website, typically a week after an episode airs. To find them and to learn more about the Shalom Hartman Institute, visit us online at shalomhartman.org. We want to know what you think about the show. You can rate and review us on iTunes to help more people discover the show. You can also write to us at [email protected].

Subscribe to our show everywhere podcasts are available. See you in two weeks. Thanks for listening. 

Elana and Yossi, thank you for being with me, for its wonderful being together as we start the new year with a potential for something interesting. Pleasure being with you. Shana Tova.

Yossi: Shana Tovah everyone. Pleasure to be with you.

Elana: Absolutely. Shana Tova.