Thirty years after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, Yehuda Kurtzer speaks with Yossi Beilin, one of the architects of the Oslo Accords, about the night that changed Israel forever. Together they revisit Rabin’s legacy, the rise of extremism that followed, and ask: what will it take to revive the hope of peace? 

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Rabin, Oslo, and the Road Not Taken Transcript

Note: This is a lightly edited transcript of a conversation, please excuse any errors.

Yehuda: Hi everyone. Welcome to Identity/Crisis, a show from the Shalom Hartman Institute, creating better conversations about the essential issues facing Jewish life. I’m Yehuda Kurtzer. We’re recording on Thursday, October 30th, 2025 from Jerusalem.

At some point in my early adulthood, I resolved to try to be a person who lived a life without being consumed by regret. Regret about what you did right or wrong, how you altered your life’s timeline with your choices. These are powerful emotions, akin to the “fear of missing out,” something that I think can be debilitating. We can learn a lot, I think, from turning points in our lives. And today we’re gonna engage in one such exercise, but the fantasy of trying to unmake decisions we’ve made, or historical circumstances we’ve been in, and the bad feeling of powerlessness in the face of the past, which sometimes shows up as regret, makes us none the wiser and none the happier.

It’s interesting to see how much the genre of alternate histories has grown up to ask those kinds of questions in the past a hundred years or so. Maybe it’s because we live in an era now with so much more knowledge about events unfolding in real time and their implications. So our inclination to fantasize about different timelines of history has become stronger. Maybe this is all a response to the unbelievably turbulent 20th century where the world and all of its norms and all of its supposed progress got overturned so quickly and so violently. The 20th century became a kind of alternate history and invites us to consider all the ways you might turn the world upside down and maybe read it differently.

Think about all of the ways that fantasy and fiction invite us to consider if historical events went slightly differently and all the ways that fantasy and fiction show up again when things start feeling upside down again. It’s not a coincidence that they produced and released the shows, “The Plot Against America” and “The Man in the High Castle” right around the time of the first Trump administration. Ironically, it seems studying alternate timelines of history becomes a way of interrogating a complicated timeline of history in which we’re actually living.

The other risk though that comes with alternate history, regrets about the roads not taken in the past, is that they’re both ripe breeding grounds for conspiracy theories. When you look back at past ruptures, imagine other scenarios you might feel powerless in the face of a past you wish had unfolded differently or that should have unfolded differently. All of that are conditions for anxious people to look for coverups and lies that must have brought these events to pass. People become convinced that if they can unmask the things they don’t understand about the past, maybe some redemption will come to light, but the deeper you dig, the darker it gets.

Nevertheless, I feel a lot of regret about what unfolded in Israel because of the assassination of Yitzchak Rabin, of blessed memory, which we mark 30 years ago this week. I find myself drawn sometimes hopelessly and desperately to alternate timelines, histories, to try to imagine what could have been different for Israelis and Palestinians had he survived.

I suppose I’m not surprised, even though I’m horrified that the narrative of the assassination has been plagued almost since it happened, by conspiracy theories, advanced by people who maybe just couldn’t confront the magnitude of what had happened or who couldn’t deal with the ramifications of what it meant for them, about who was responsible and what it all meant for Israeli society.

The Rabin assassination is a haunted event in ways that almost feels literary. A prime minister who rose to power because of his wartime heroics, helping to establish and secure the state of Israel, and then becoming a courageous politician who best understands the risks of peacemaking, but tries to do it anyway. Rabin becomes a martyr for those risks not taken. The precious peace recedes in the face of the violent extremists who sought to prevent it from taking root, the campaign against him, which was led by an upstart nationalist politician who then goes on to dominate Israeli political life for over a quarter century.

It’s not hard to see why anyone who cares about the pursuit of peace might look back at that moment as the hinge upon which our recent history seems to swing, how a once-open door quickly became shut. I remember every minute of what happened and where I was, and even how I felt.

I feel a special place in my heart for Yitzchak Rabbi, not just because of my politics or my optimism, but also because my father had the assignment of being with Rabin for the morning of the Oslo Accord signing on the White House lawn. I remember him telling me afterwards about Rabin’s trepidation, and I found that basic story of humanity in the presence of moral courage to be extremely uplifting. I suppose it’s also worth noting that I was 18 at the time of his assassination, which is the period in our lives when our identities and our understanding of the world have the most plasticity.

I can’t help but feel that my relentless belief that the story here in Israel can turn out better than the present is rooted in a sense that we were once very close and that, but for this awful historical event, it might have turned out very differently.

I say this even as I remind myself to live life without regrets about what could have been, even as I insist that we don’t get to choose the era of history we’re born in, definitely not the seismic events of our lifetime. We only get to choose what to do with the cars that we are dealt. I suppose that that belief is what lies at the core of my continued belief, that Zionism must never be fatalist, always imaginative about a better future. Even so, I know that a small piece of that Zionism died that fateful night in King Square in Tel Aviv 30 years ago.

I’m joined today by a person who’s very special to me. Yossi Beilin held four ministries in government, was a key leader in the Labor Party for a long time, then later served as the chair of the Meretz-Yachad political party. He was a critical figure in the peace process, a leader in the back channel negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords. He was the founder of the Economic Cooperation Foundation, a non-partisan think tank devoted to strengthening the infrastructure to make possible peace and coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians.

Now, in addition to his life in the private sector. He is also the chair of Hillel Israel. Yossi provided the inspiration and the idea behind Birthright Israel. He has always represented for me the North star of what it means to be the full combination of a patriot, a critic, and a peacemaker. I had the privilege years ago of interning for Yessi for two summers in college, both in the Knesset and at ECF. Those were formative experiences for me, and I think about them often.

Yes. I’m very honored that you’re taking time to be with us today. Thank you for being on the podcast.

Yossi: Thank you. Thank you very much.

Yehuda: I wanna ask you to take us back 30 years and maybe just paint a picture of what you remember from that night of the assassination. Where were you? What were your initial emotions and what was your sense at the time? I’m sure it was not just a tragic, but a traumatic experience for you.

Yossi: I was in New York and I had some meetings there. It was Saturday and on Saturday there was a branch offered by Colette Avital, who was then the Consul General of Israel in New York. Dozens of people participated in this event, and some of them were Israelis who happened to be in New York, and most of them were American Jews.

And one of the main issues on the agenda was the demonstration which was planned to take place later on in Israel in support of peace. So people ask me whether, I hope, I thought that enough people will participate, you know, these things. And after my talk with them about the prospects for peace, it was very, very close to the decision of Israel and the PLO to have an interim agreement for five years.

And I went back home on foot to the hotel and I was accompanied by Amos Oz, an old friend of mine. He knew that I was very eager to have a permanent agreement with the Palestinians and to cut the long term of five years, I thought that it was a mistake to have an interim agreement rather than a permanent one. So I told him where we stood with the permanent informal efforts. And he had many questions and he was very positive and helpful and he came to the hotel and the discussion between us had not ended.

So he came to my room and we continued to speak and as we were speaking, the head of my office called me and said that there was an attempt on Rabin’s life and that he was wounded. So both of us were shocked, but, you know, when you hear something like this, you want to believe immediately that he was wounded, but, well, it will be a few this way or another.

And then she called me again and, and she said that he died and Amos and, and myself hugged each other and cried like, like babies. It never happened to me before. I mean, not that I never cry, but, in the funerals of my parents… never, never. I think that both of us, Amos and myself, thought that it was the… kind of the end of the world.

And then my bodyguards tried to find, of course, a way to bring me back to Israel as soon as possible. And I, of course, gave up on my other missions in the United States. And Ehud Barak happened to stay in the same hotel, so we coordinated our flight back. El Al had to ask some people to give up on this, the flight, which was not very convenient, but I was assured that they understood the situation and they had no complaints about it.

We sat together, Barak and myself. The whole flight. We never slept. And we talked with each other about what might happen in the future. Well, this discussion was never recorded. It’s a pity because it shows something about our hopes, but also about our mistake. And the mistake was that the men could be assassinated, but the mission and the aim could not be assassinated.

This is usually the case. I mean, when something awful like that, and you don’t have, thanks heaven, too many cases like that, but you, you want to believe that even if people die naturally, that even if they went, still their mission, their ideas, are still there and, and that you are committed to their way or something like that. That was our feeling and we were totally wrong.

The assassination of Rabin was one of the biggest successes of the anti-Oslo camp in Israel. And it’s hard to admit it. It’s, I, I, I, I’m saying it reluctantly, but I’m afraid that this was the case. I mean, we in a way, swore to each other that we will do whatever we could in order to continue this way.

And it was a little bit difficult for Ehud because he was reserved about Oslo. He supported Oslo in the bottom line, but he was reserved. For me, I launched it, so it was easy for me to say, we will continue. But both of us were committed to the continuation and we also thought then that people would understand how crazy it is to oppose what Rabin did and that there will be a big support for our aims. In that case, I mean, we were right for a very short while, in which the public opinion poll told us that Labor got 24-5 seats, I believe, more thank Likud. But it ended with the increase of violence of Palestinian terrorists.

Yehuda: Two things that you raised are interesting to me. One is that I think in the popular imagination, the real thing that killed the peace process was the rise of Palestinian suicide bombing, really starting shortly after the assassination. I remember living here through ’95 and ’96, the buses were blowing up in Jerusalem every week, coffee shops, and then it culminated with the second Intifada.

Do you think Israeli society understands that those were companion pieces to each other? That you had basically the extreme right and the extreme left conspiring to destroy something that could have built a broad consensus?

Yossi: I don’t know. What I can say is that Rabin was committed to it, although I must admit that many things that he did and said, it seemed as if he did it against his will. You know, even voting once in the party of, on something, and he was asked, I remember, would he vote? He said, eh, yes, I, ah, I’ll do it. You know, in, in many cases he did things but was seen as somebody who was hesitant about it or did it only because he had to.

But this was not the case with him. So he was very committed to the peace process. Before the elections in the electoral campaign, he said that in between, in six to nine months, if you remember, I will have an agreement with the Palestinians. This was his banner. This was his promise for the election. It’s not something that he decided to do after the elections. So he was very committed to it.

And eventually with his death, there was a frustration on both camps. I mean, the, the Palestinians began to like Rabin. This was not from the beginning. It was not from the First Intifada. He was seen as somebody who was very tough on Palestinians. But during the process they liked him more and more.

And, you know, even Arafat came to his, to Rabin’s home in Tel Aviv to meet with Leah Rabin. And they said that it might be the end of the process. People, like myself said to them, don’t think so, even, I mean, we will fight for, for our way, which we tried to do, but it was very, very difficult, because the assassination showed something about the weakness of the Israeli side. You know, people say, how can you make peace with the Palestinians? You can’t trust them. The regime might disappear, people can kill Arafat, and eventually our democracy proved to the world that we are fragile too, or even more so. So this was a very important point, which I did not catch at the beginning, the weakness of Israel as it was portrayed by the assassination.

But yes, eventually I think that there is no question that the attitude towards the Palestinian terrorism had much to do with the feelings of the Israelis that this process cannot continue as is. But I think that what Rabin used to say is that we should fight against terrorism as if there is no peace process, and we will continue with the peace process as if there is no terrorism. That was a paraphrase of what, Ben Gurion that said in the thirties, that we should fight the British mandate as if there is no war and participate in the war and the, their auspices as if there is no a house, there are no house decisions against the Jewish group or minority in the Palestine. It is easy to say. Very, very difficult to do. Very difficult to do.

And actually, he was the only one who said something like that. And since him, I mean, nobody said the same. He was strong enough to do that, and in the worst days, in the darkest days of terrorism, he would say, okay, okay, it’s very sad. He used to go to every event of terrorism and people would shout and scream on him, but he went there, and said even there, we should continue with the peace process, because he understood that peace is a very, very important part of security. And after that, it was apparently very difficult for his successors to do the same.

Yehuda: It’s a complicated thing that you’re saying, which is that, you know, you first said that there are just dimensions of Israeli society that become revealed as weaker than anticipated and exposing a whole variety of fissures in the society that have been exploited, actually, politically for the last 30 years.

But at the same time, it may not have been the society, it may just have been a unique individual. I certainly felt that way. I felt that the gap between how Israelis understood Rabin and how they understood Peres was enormous. The trust that they were willing to put in Rabin and the trust that they were willing to put in Peres was enormous, the difference between those. And especially because, I don’t know, in the first month or so following the assassination, you felt a sense in the country of just total shock that this is what it had come to. You know, it had biblical qualities to it. It was like the assassination of Gedaliah ben Achikam during the First Temple period. I mean, it’s just a massive event, and yet the successor leadership wasn’t able to do it.

What do you think were the personal qualities of Rabin that set him apart? And I’d love to know more about your own relationship with him that enabled you to see those qualities

Yossi: in his first term as the Prime Minister, ’74-’77. He was not considered a good prime minister. He came as an outsider to the system and made many mistakes, and he spoke up his mind in situations which did not demand sincerity. I’ll give you an example. In his first visit to the United States as a Prime Minister, he had a long discussion with president Carter.

At the end of the discussion, Carter asked him whether he would like to come with him to the second floor to see his daughter there, and he said, no. Now Yehuda, think about yourself even if you are not very much interested in the daughter of Carter, still, if the president of the United States is asking this question, you would not even think for a moment to refuse. Why? He didn’t have another appointment.

This was Rabin. He was a military person who spoke up his mind and irritated many people. In his second term in ’92-’95. He was a very, very good prime minister. He studied the system, he understood, and he was a little bit more careful. Not totally, but more careful than before. And he had his agenda, which I’m not sure he had in ’74. I interviewed him when he came back from his mission in Washington in the end of ’73, before the Yom Kippur War, he was an American senator, a Republican, but one, and I couldn’t understand from him, what did he want to do?

It was then before the elections of the Knesset, of course, so I was sent to interview him by my paper because people thought that he would be high on the Labor list to the. He wasn’t, by the way. He was number 20. And suddenly because of the fact that there were no others and the whole Dayan and Abba Eban and Golda Meir and all of them decided to resign, he was left because he was not involved.

So he was then very weak as a prime minister, made mistakes. And then he, he was a very, a very good one and very, and, and very strong one. And the fact that he was a military person, that they had the commander of the Army, who worked for him when he was ready to go for compromises.

Now, Pereswas liked by a smaller group of people, but in the elections in ’96, he got just 20,000 votes less than Netanyahu. They were almost equal. And when he was the head of the party in ’81, for example, he got 47 seats in the Knesset while Begin got 48. So he was always on the edge, I mean, almost there, but for ’84, when he was, he got 44, the Likud got 41, and he became the Prime Minister for two years and he was a wonderful prime minister.

So Rabin was anti-charismatic in the first time and charismatic in the second one. Can it happen? I don’t know, but I think that that was the case. And he did, in education, in infrastructure in other areas, really, he was really wonderful. In deciding about the agenda and the priorities of Israel, and the first one for him was peace with the Palestinians.

Yehuda: How did you cultivate the trust with him to launch the Oslo process? I mean, until—

Yossi: I didn’t.

Yehuda: What do you mean?

Yossi: I didn’t. We had our differences. I mean, first and foremost, on the peace process. I mean, he was considered a hawk. And he didn’t like many of the things that I did and what I said about the need for a two state solution and things like that.

Now, I knew that had I, as a deputy foreign minister, come to him as a Prime Minister and said to him, Yitzchak, I would like to go to Norway to meet with the PLO, he would say, don’t do that. Don’t do that. I mean, for years I tried to cancel the idiotic law, which prevented Israelis from meetings with the PLO people, even socially. And eventually I convinced the Labor conference in ’92 to agree to the change of the law.

But when we began our term, it was very difficult because he, Rabin, was not ready to change the law so quickly and when eventually I put some pressure with the Meretz members of the Knesset change the law, to abolish the law, he appeared in the Knesset and said the fact that we changed the law and that it is not forbidden anymore to meet with PLO people doesn’t mean that we are going to negotiate with the PLO. We were a few days from the first meeting with the PLO people, and I knew that he would say no to me had I not concealed it from Peres and Rabin.

Only later on, what really happened because of his promise to the people to have an agreement with the Palestinians, and there was no clue. He didn’t have a plan. That is something that I revealed only later on. He didn’t have a plan how to do it and with whom to do it. So he became a Prime Minister. This was the first priority. And how one does it? And then when we came to him after we came to him in February ’93, telling him about the channel that we opened in Oslo, he felt that he did not fulfill his commitment to the people. He was very much criticized by the media, by, not by everybody, but by people who expected him to do something with peace. And he did nothing.

And here we are with a paper, a short one full of articles of agreements between us and the, and the PLO. So I think that he actually jumped on the opportunity, but had I done it beforehand, I don’t think that he would be ready to give me the green light.

Yehuda: The story I’ve always heard was that the final status agreement was on Rabin’s desk when he was assassinated, or at least the five-year plan. Do you feel that it was actually that close? Had he not been assassinated on that night, there would’ve been something signed within a very short period of time, or was there still a lot of work to do? Both vis-a-vis the negotiations, but also vis-a-vis the will of the Israeli people to actually get behind an agreement?

Yossi: The will was there. I mean, people were supportive of, maybe the majority was not huge, but you can see the public opinion polls. With big terrorist events it went down; when there was a, a kind of a lull, it went up. But we had to get to a permanent agreement by May 4th, 1999.

So we had time, you know, you spoke about the opportunities in life and the fact that it is actually impossible to get to a certain point in your life and to say, now I, I have another decision. So it’s impossible to know what would happen had he not been assassinated. Even the polls were not too good for him. So he could be just, he could fail in the elections. But I’m sure that had he remained Prime Minister, he would do whatever he could, because of this continue with the peace processes as if there is no terrorism, and towards a peace treaty with the Palestinians.

I’m not sure about it. Nobody can be sure about it. I’m very careful not to say it is, it was almost there, because we, we didn’t begin even the talks about the permanent agreement, we didn’t begin it. It was just few months after signing the interim agreement of, in September 28th, ’90, ’95. Nothing. I mean, he was actually assassinated because of the interim agreement.

Yehuda: I remember the degree of anger and hostility that was coming at him at the right during that time. I remember those protests with, you know, his face with the SS uniform was kind of a famous image. The incitement that was taking place at Likud rallies that Netanyahu presided over.

So I guess I have two questions. I’ll start with the first, which is, in hindsight, it all makes sense that a climate of incitement would lead to something like this. How much fear was there at the time on the inside of the Rabin Circle that something like this could have happened? When you heard the news, you were shocked, but were you also not shocked given the vociferousness of the hate against him?

Yossi: It was inconceivable. Inconceivable, I mean, when I’m speaking about the mistake that we were making, we believe that there would be opposition to the Oslo process, on our side, on the Palestinian side, but what we could do is to extrapolate from the past and to remember what kind of demonstration we had in the past. Closing roads and things like that, even main roads. But this is what we knew. We did not think about suicide terrorists. We did not think about killing our prime minister. He did not think about it. He did not even wear a vest, an anti-bullet vest.

I remember we, we, we had a meeting with him, all, all the ministers. No, it was, it was the party members of, and we spoke about the demonstration. And, I don’t remember who was it, it was not me, but some of us, one of us asked him whether he was going to wear a vest and said, hah! As if something like that doesn’t happen in Israel. This was the shock.

Yehuda: You know, I also remember being so surprised by the speed through which Netanyahu recovered politically from having presided over these rallies to actually becoming electable to the Israeli people. I mean, it’s, it’s not as surprising as the fact that we have the videos of young Itamar Ben Gvir threatening the Prime Minister in 1995, and he’s a minister in the Israeli Knesset. But that, at least you can say, that takes 25 years.

I’m curious whether you saw it that way or whether it just was obvious that once the peace process began to unravel, that it was gonna be the head of the opposition, regardless of the fact that there had been, you know, several months of what you might call a kind of, some amount of cheshbon nefesh within Israeli society, some amount of self-reflection and awareness that the tensions had reached a boiling point. Was it, in that sense, do you remember being kind of surprised and shocked that even though the right had brought about this climate, that they managed to win in the following elections?

Yossi: I couldn’t believe it. I couldn’t believe it. Which says something about myself. I mean, you know, I, I appreciated myself very much more before. Things were obvious for me that nobody will kill a Prime Minister in Israel. No, of course not a Jew. It’s like, now, with October 7th, I mean, after October 7th, I couldn’t believe, again, it’s the same me. I could not believe that Netanyahu will remain the prime minister of Israel after what happened to us.

Yehuda: Yeah. Hard to believe.

Yossi: So I became very humble.

Yehuda: Huh. After October 7th I went back and re-read Fukuyama, The End of History.

Yossi: Many of us did.

Yehuda: Right. Fascinating. It’s like, incredible to look back. Here is the amazing thing that Fukuyama says in 1999, right? You know, technocratic liberalism is basically gonna win out. Liberal democracy is the prevailing political condition. This, you know, and he says, though, he knows exactly what’s gonna happen. He just, he thinks that it’s the easy thing to solve and it turns out to be exactly the thing that has destroyed liberal democracy.

He says near the end of the article, there are two possible threats to this future of technocratic, liberal democracy and capitalism. He says one is religion and the other is nationalism. He says, but not to worry, we’re past the arrow—

Yossi: Moderate issues.

Yehuda: Yeah, moderate issues. So this is the piece that I’ve wondered about with the left and its reckoning, and the main blind spot, I think, was that those were the forces that killed Rabin. Those were the forces that ultimately demolished support for the peace process in Israel, by the way, not merely on the Jewish side, also on the Palestinian side.

Yossi: Of course.

Yehuda; The Palestinian leadership that was in the negotiations were secular in nature. I wonder whether you look back at that as one of the missing pieces of what would’ve had to have been addressed, not— forget about this assassination of Rabin—but in order to actually build the resilience of a final status agreement. And as part of that, what needs to happen for the future of this peace process, if there ever should be one, when we know it’s gonna have to route through religion and nationalism as opposed to around it.

Yossi: Well, it is a very, very important question and my answer should be education in something like this, but this will not be my answer. I think that we are speaking about a small number of people. I’m speaking now about Israel. Maybe it is not the same on the Palestinian side. We knew well from the danger may step, we know them. We know them, where they live. I think that if tomorrow there is an effort to get to a permanent agreement, we should be sure that these people are controlled.

Sorry for the answer, I hate it, but eventually the idea of education for peace is important and is done. And I’m involved in it, but I know that you cannot prepare the people for peace in a few years and, and hope that it will succeed. It is an ongoing process of educating people for peace, for the understanding of the other, and understanding that peace is a vital part of security and so on and so forth. So in the meantime, you should do it both. I mean, you should continue and, and, and educate if you can. But on the other hand, you should be tough on these people. You know them and you can prevent it if you know them.

Yehuda: There seems to be no resolve in Israel to deal with the extremism. None at all.

Yossi: I think that it is feasible. I mean, you have people who are against the state of Israel, extremists, but against the state of Israel from their own crazy ideology or whatever. These people are there and, and, and you know where they live.

Yehuda: Yeah. And it’s a funny day to be talking about this a little bit because you know, half of Jerusalem is shut down right now with hundreds of thousands of ultra-Orthodox men blocking the entrance of the city. And I heard years ago, an explanation of why the rabbis permit these demonstrations from happening. And it has to do with their own control of their own communities, which is once in a while you gotta let people take out the steam in close societies, and that enables them to come back and basically be obedient in their systems.

But it does mean that society’s kind of constantly making a choice, which battles to fight and which battles to ignore. And it’s been a source of frustration to me that there was no real efforts to continue to suppress the kind of violent extremism in Israel. It doesn’t get prosecuted in the West Bank.

Yossi: Exactly. Unbelievable.

Yehuda: All right. I’m gonna ask you one last question, if that’s all right. It’s a hard question. I guess thinking back to Rabin, but maybe using Rabin and especially given the moment in Israel politically where, as you said, education is critical, our organization is trying to be at the forefront of promoting something, of a conversation about peace that could try to find ways to have language within the Jewish tradition to appeal to the folks among our people who are least hospitable to it in some ways.

Anything providing you with some optimism that the legacy of Rabin and the peace process could one day come back? I know you still speak about it. I know you speak now also about other models, confederations, other scenarios that were not where this process was leading. Where are you looking these days for the kind of optimism to take inspiration from that period of time, that window of history that closed at that time, to figure out whether the story of peace between Israelis and Palestinians could really be possible?

Yossi: It’ll be possible because we cannot afford ourselves something else, I mean, there is the demographic clock, which is ticking. We are 7.5 million Jews and 7.5 million Palestinians, between the river and the sea. These, these are the numbers. So it won’t take long before it is a minority of Jews dominating a majority of Palestinians. And then Israel will not be a democratic state because it’ll have to issue laws which will resemble other countries, especially one, and we cannot do that.

So Israel must find the solution. And the solution of partition is not the first option, but it is understanding during the years that the idea that all the American Jews will come to Israel and that there will be no demographic problem is not a serious one, and the number of Jews that we have, we must divide.

That, that is why I’m optimistic about it and, and for the Palestinians for sure, this is the only way for them to fulfill their right for self-determination. The main problem today is not to solve the issues of Jerusalem and refugees and borders and so on, because we have solved them, informally and formally, during the last 30 years. We know by now almost exactly what is the room for maneuver, for each of us, Palestinians and Israelis, in which we can agree. So the main issues are behind us, for those who want peace. I mean those who don’t want peace, it’s still far from that.

But the point is to deal with the major issue, which became the major issue. It is the settlements. I mean, the number of settlers when we signed the Oslo agreement was about 100,000. Today it is more than half a million, and I don’t see any potential Prime Minister in Israel, even somebody who is really moderate and understands the need for peace, who is ready to evacuate hundreds of thousands of Israelis? Of course, most of them will be part of Israel in a context of a land swap, but still about 200,000 Israelis will find themselves in the Palestinian state. And if you have a confederation, and if you say that each of them would be, remain an Israeli citizen, but will become a Palestinian permanent residence, and the same number of Palestinian citizens would be allowed to become Israeli permanent residents, you are solving the major issue. The major issue on the agenda.

So you need somebody who is strong enough, understands how important it is and how urgent it is, and you have these people, even in the current leadership who may go for it if they, they decide.

What I’m saying about Rabin is not, he did not suggest to sacrifice himself as a, an Israeli army officer, but he was ready to sacrifice himself. And he knew that such a danger exists because of his commitment to his country. And the same with peace. I don’t know whether he took it into consideration, but he was ready to die for his country in peace and war. And so if you ask me about the legacy, he didn’t leave books and ideologies and things like that, but he left his own memory. He, as a leader with the advantages and the disadvantages, is a symbol. And I think that people should understand that you can achieve a lot if you take into account the price that you may personally pay.

You know, I understand that we are close to the end of this interview and I can tell you something about Yasser Arafat, which has nothing to do with Rabin. It happened after his assassination five years later. In the King David talks with Barak and President Clinton. There was a moment in which the American group suggested something to Arafat, and after some hours, Arafat came to Clinton and said to him, Mr. President, I must tell you, I mean, I got your paper, but if I accept it, it will come to my funeral. This was something that President Clinton told me later on, so I said to him, Mr. President, so what did you say to him? He looked at me and said, Yossi, what would you say to him? I say, if I may, I would say, “so what?”

And I think that Rabin was the one who said to himself, “so what?”

Yehuda: It’s a really powerful place to stop. Yossi, I can’t thank you enough.

Yossi: Thank you very much. Thank you for having me. And thank you for this discussion.