What’s next for Israel’s democracy after years of polarization, war, and political stagnation?

In this episode of Identity/Crisis, Yehuda Kurtzer talks with Tani Frank, Director of the Judaism and State Policy Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem, about Israel’s rapidly changing political landscape ahead of the 2026 elections. They discuss Benjamin Netanyahu’s enduring power, the rise of a possible “Zionist alliance,” and the growing demand for political accountability and unity after October 7.  

A transcript of this episode is available below.

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Israel 2026: The Next Elections and What’s at Stake Transcript

Note: This is a lightly edited transcript of a conversation, please excuse any errors.

Yehuda: Hi everyone. Welcome to Identity/Crisis, a show from the Shalom Hartman Institute creating better conversations about the essential issues facing Jewish life. I’m Yehuda Kurtzer. We’re recording on Tuesday, October 28th, 2025 in Jerusalem, so the next elections here in Israel are scheduled, God willing, for October 27th, 2026, almost exactly a year from today.

I say the phrase, God willing, not just as a superstitious tick, something that religious Jews oftentimes say when they’re talking about the future, but also because, God willing, I’m eager to see a new government replace this dangerously right-wing one, or at least get a chance to try. I also say it ’cause I no longer take for granted that such elections will actually happen according to the right timeline.

In America this past week, President Trump and some of his acolytes continued to float the hypothetical possibility that he will find a way to abrogate the Constitution and get himself a third term. And such authoritarian anti-democratic gestures are globally contagious.

It would’ve been hard to believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu, who through Israel’s parliamentary system, has led the government here almost uninterrupted since 2009, that he would’ve allowed the elections to happen if they had landed in the middle of the war. I’m sure he would’ve found a way out, given how many people believe that he continued the war past its due date for his own political considerations. Who knows what’s in store over the next year, as he seeks to stay in power, perhaps indefinitely.

So, yes, God willing and democracy allowing, there will be new elections here in a year, and if you pay attention closely, the sprint is on in a race that seems entirely unpredictable, especially in this country where news and attitudes about the news seem to change on a daily basis. Throughout much of the war, in Netanyahu’s opinion, polls were extremely unfavorable. The government didn’t fall, in spite of constant threats by the extreme right-wing parties who were propping up the government, that they would tear it down if they didn’t get their way based on decisions related to the prosecution of the war. And it stands to reason that they recognized that their political fates might have suffered like Netanyahu’s reputation at the time, and that they gained more from keeping government intact than taking their chances with the general public.

Then there was the shockingly successful campaign against Hezbollah, the victorious mini-war with Iran, and the intervention of the Trump administration to coerce a ceasefire. And the last living hostages came home. And now the story looks a little rosier for the Prime Minister. Netanyahu has cultivated his entire political persona by convincing the electorate that there are things he’s willing to do and can achieve for Israel’s security that no one else can do—Only I will protect you.

And although the worst failing of Israel’s security services in its history happened under his watch on October 7th, 2023, he can now point to this recovery and to these triumphs as further evidence of his magical powers. Some opinion polls now predict that the government could stay in power with only minor fluctuations from the current lineup of seats and parties.

Of course, we all know to distrust polling. That’s true both of polls before elections, certainly a year out, sometimes even a day out, and even of exit polls, and it’s impossible to project exactly what will be the case a year from now. Maybe today’s episode, looking ahead towards those elections will be a time capsule of sorts, and we’re gonna look back to see where we were right and where we were wrong.

But ultimately, I’m less interested in predicting the future and more interested in planning for it. The folks who will ultimately lead the change in this society, as with any other, are those who are prepared for a variety of scenarios, and especially those who have action plans for the moment that they can actually get something done.

If you remember the change government of Bennett and Lapid that was in place for what? A year? It did move the needle on a set of issues, and maybe one way to understand the efforts by the Netanyahu government that followed, who tried to radically remake the judiciary system, reflected their understanding that if you wanna win permanently, you have to change the rules. This, too, is part of the Trump playbook in America, and it’s fascinating to see the ways that Israelis have resisted those efforts more successfully until now than Americans have.

Tani Frank, my colleague here at Hartman, and our guest today is one of those future scenario planners. He was a guest previously on the show a few years ago when he first came to Hartman. I think that was back in 2022, which seems like years and years and years ago. Tani is the director of the Center for Judaism and State Policy at the Shalom Hartman Institute. He has worked with legislators as a consultant and as advisors for economic and legislative issues, including responsibility for drafting bills, promoting ideas on the inside of the Knesset on issues of religion and state.

He was one of the founding directors of Judaism for All, an initiative focused on creating empowering alternative religious services and private conversion courts. He also has worked in the past with Ne’emanei Torah Va’Avodah as the head of the State and Religion department, working to advocate for changes in the status quo regarding religion and state in Israel.

Here at Hartman, the Judaism and State Policy Center promotes the basic values of the state of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and as a national homeland for the Jewish people by proposing and reshaping and advocating policies on issues related to Judaism and state advancing a liberal pluralistic agenda through public advocacy, applied research and issue specific public campaigns. The Center and Tani are hard at work anticipating the possibility of those new elections, and in particular the brief window of time as governments get negotiated for when we might actually seize change on these issues in Israeli society.

So thanks for coming back, Tani and for thinking a little bit about the future I have to say. It’s interesting. This episode would have not been possible to record a few weeks ago, not because there aren’t elections a year from now, but because, just my sense even being here a couple days, is that the atmosphere has changed so significantly since the ceasefire that it feels like there’s more appetite for a future oriented conversation than I’ve seen. Is that my impression or do you think that’s actually taken place here?

Tani: No, that’s the general atmosphere right now. People have shifted, you know, from losing hope and not being able to know what’s gonna be happening tomorrow to, well, now we need to understand what we do with the, so-called, “the day after” here in Israel. Not only in terms of the whole thing—it goes on, it will go on, still go on in Gaza, but with it basically this Israeli society, how can we go forward as a society together?

Yehuda: So let’s reflect a little bit on the whole polling story. Really over the past two years, because as I described, Netanyahu did drop very considerably throughout the war. The system doesn’t allow bad polling to take down the Prime Minister, otherwise this country would’ve new Prime ministers every 20 minutes.

I’m actually curious about that, how this country vacillates so quickly in terms of the popularity of its politicians and how much you think the recovery of his reputation of the last couple of weeks is gonna stick. Like what are we seeing here around political trends that you think feel like real changes and what is hard to read?

Tani: Well, first of all, I have to agree that, you know, you can’t trust the polls and it’s, it’s a Hebrew phrase, right? Midvar sheker tirchak. So Shimon Peres quotes, midvar sekel tirchak. So we are moving away from believing the polls, and there’s a lot of trends you don’t see in the polls.

But having said that, of course you can see some trends. I think a lot of people here in Israel and I don’t know, maybe also in the States thought that Netanyahu era is basically done after October 7th, even right after, and I’m not gonna only talk about myself, but only a bit about myself and about some of my colleagues that know and understand how we work here. Netanyahu wasn’t going to go home anyway. Even now when he supposedly doesn’t have a coalition, right? The Haredi parties are outside of the coalition formally. It still has the votes to keep on going maybe until October 27, and maybe even further.

I think one of the things that we do see is that if we were talking about what happened here before October 7th, which was basically the judicial overhaul, the demonstrations against it, which caused us to even be more divided, more polarized in terms of two political camps, more similar to what’s going on in the states.

I think right now we can’t speak about two political camps. We see a lot of people who due to the war, due to the, basically mostly the moves of this coalition, this government say we need to do stuff in order to save what we can to recover and to basically bring Israel back to what it should be. And there’s a lot of talks about breaking the dichotomy between the opposition and the coalition and maybe creating what they call a Zionist treaty or a Zionist alliance, which would not include Haredi parties in the coalition, but also some people are still afraid from some kind of an Arab priority in the coalition. So that’s something that do not really reflect in the polls.

I think politicians, like many Benny Gantz are seeing it in their deep public opinion researchers, and I know that there’s a growing movement of mostly people who served in the Army as reserved and other people who come from Gaza and understand that we cannot just keep fighting each other. We need to work together and we need to force that on the political system.

Yehuda: In other words, it’s not simply a question of pro-Netanyahu, anti-Netanyahu. It’s actually—we need to, kind of replace the polarization together with some version of kind of centrist consensus politics in this country that resists that polarization and advance something new.

Listen, there’s a risk to that kind of politics. There’s parts of it that I’m sure many people would find appealing. We don’t want to kill one another, especially when there are enemies that you actually have to kill, and especially when you need to negotiate towards a new future. But part of me also feels like it’s terrible politics.

I mean, Benny Gantz wrote that piece in the New York Times, an op-ed in the New York Times, maybe a month ago.

Tani: Yeah, something like that.

Yehuda: Something like that. In which one of the things he said, which I found so shocking kind of from a politician standpoint was, here are all the things that Benjamin Netanyahu, who I think should no longer be the Prime Minister of Israel, has done right. Here’s all the things that I’m gonna go out and publicly defend him for doing. And I understood it as a Zionist, to say that the real fight for Zionism is not just with our enemies, but it’s also with the international community and the reputation of the Jewish people in the state of Israel.

But I also felt like you’re basically writing the script for Netanyahu to be able to resist any of his competitors, including Benny Gantz, you lose the ability to differentiate yourself from the Prime Minister you’re trying to defeat. What’s the logic, politically, of doing those kinds of things when you actually, when he, when Gantz and Lapid and Bennett have got to figure out a way to meaningfully differentiate themselves from Netanyahu if they’re gonna have a political future.

Tani: Okay, so first of all, you need to understand the context in which it was written. Gantz basically loses a lot of power politically right. Since Gadi Eisenkot left and Gadi Eisenkot was basically second in command. Also, former chief of IDF, someone who, I would say the people in the liberal camp in Israel see as a potential successor of Netanyahu, potential leader more than Gantz. Didn’t get his hands dirty when Gantz had to. He said he had to come in and join Netanyahu, basically—I, I’m talking about 2020 during COVID and right now during the war, in the beginning of the war, he and Gantz and Eisenkot went together in the coalition and basically some would say saved Netanyahu from losing any kind of legitimacy or support in Israel.

So he’s looking, he’s looking at the trends and he’s looking at what he can do. Also, I would say he has a soft spot for bringing us together. There’s a whole discourse about, let’s agree on what we can agree, and let’s move from a philosophy or a political culture of winning and beating each other and setting aside differences and let’s agree on what we can agree. And I think it talks to a lot of people, mostly in the liberal camp, a lot of people from, let’s say moderate Religious Zionist sector. A lot of people who supported Naftali Bennett even before he got elected and became a Prime Minister.

I think a lot of people are looking at it, and I would also add to that, that people are tired. People are exhausted. I mean, we fought each other before October 7th, and then that happened, and people were fighting next to each other, right? You, you remember the, the photos and the visuals of Achim Laneshek, coming together with other people and there’s a lot of other initiatives that say we need to come together as people right now, we need to put aside, and pro-Bibi, not pro-Bibi, is… that language just does not work as it used to be. So he’s aiming at that route.

I totally agree, that’s not something that would work for the opposition, let’s say, and that could bring Netanyahu back to life and basically, I think that’s one of the best achievements of, political achievements of Netanyahu, keeping him alive and keeping him legitimate in terms of still being Prime Minister.

I do think that people are also tired of this government, so there is a picture of the next government being some sort of mixture of some people from the opposition joining Netanyahu, and I think Gantz is trying to prepare and to lay out the grounds for it.

Yehuda: Yeah. Look, think one of the things that’s complicated, especially for liberal audiences that care about Israel, outside of Israel, is that the contest right now for Israel’s political future is not between right and left. It’s between right and, at best, center-right. Sometimes it’s actually between right and right. So besides the vision of, I’m tired of Netanyahu, which has failed politically in the past, rak lo Bibi, anyone but Bibi, what’s the positive vision that you see being articulated as a path forward with real policy implications for what could be more of a center-right government than this government, which includes some people who you might call center-right, and then all the way to extreme right? What are the actual policy implications that could constitute a marketable, sellable vision to the Israeli public that could potentially win an election?

Tani: Well, I will first say that I don’t think it’s even right against right. I think seeing what happened in Gaza, seeing what happened when Trump came here and just decided for us to end the war and to talk about peace—which it was something that you couldn’t say here, right? That word was not used here except for the Shalom Hartman Institute, of course. It was used in the public, Israeli public discourse. Seeing that, I think people understand that we don’t really have so much control over our security issues right now, and more or less everyone will go in the same path.

So we need to decide what we can do in terms of healing internally and healing and working against the polarization. That’s why it’s so appealing for politicians right now to talk about the fact that we need to break those camps. Again, one of the narratives of this group is we need a Zionist treaty or a Zionist alliance, which will be constituted of Zionist sectors only, Zionist parties only. That would exclude the Haredim first and foremost. That’s the discourse right now. And of course, would not be able to do anything of the likes of what happened in the change government that Mansour Abbas was part of it, although there are still some people who would rely on some Arab party, that’s not going to happen right now.

So when you talk about policy implications, the problem is that we talk about very narrow issues. I mean, we talk about the drafting of Haredim. So that, let’s say this government will be only without Haredim. They will decide at every Haredi that would not serve in the Army would not get benefits from the country, and basically it would cause a lot of people to enlist, or at least not to be a burden on the society. But that’s gonna be over.

And what else? I think one of the things that are missing are policy issues that could be translated from ideas. That’s the things that we are working on right now to see and to talk to the parties even to people from the Likud, from the most more, if you could say, there’s still some liberals in the, that is debatable, but the more moderate people from Likud are looking at the next alliance, there are political alliances, and are thinking, what can we do together?

I’ll give you an example. There’s gonna be a very big demonstration, right? Haredi demonstration. Some Likud members, even a minister from Lakud said he would join the demonstration and the protests, which are basically against the government, although he’s a minister and another minister from the Likud said, we can’t do it. We represent the working and the serving population. This is a gap that will be more and more visible, I think, after the next elections.

Yehuda: Yair Lapid said something very alarming in the last couple of days, which was that ultra-Orthodox Jews who don’t serve the army should be stripped of the right to vote. I found it a shockingly illiberal Democrat and anti-democratic thing to say. So I understand the anger that operates within the society around the Haredi, the ultra-Orthodox drain on the system, as well as a, I think a broader Israeli perception that the refusal to serve the army is just an act of disloyalty in the midst of a war.

It’s compounded by the comments made by the Sephardic chief Rabbi in the last couple of days accusing amajor figure in the Religious Zionist camp, which is connected to the army much more profoundly, about, you know, delegitimizing his Jewishness because of his—

Tani: Who had also lost a son in the war.

Yehuda: Who had lost son in the war. Yeah. So the anchor of the hostility, is that a fever pitch? How does what you described as a kind of Zionist covenant to lead the state of Israel not ultimately lose its way around also being responsible for preserving democratic culture in this country? And I, I ask it both about the delegitimization of Haredim, but also about what is actually quite painful that a quote unquote “Zionist government” cannot accommodate Arab parties who actually wanna be part of the change strategy in this country.

Tani: Well, it is alarming. I mean, Lapid wasn’t the first to say that. He joined Avigdor Lieberman, which had said it before, I think a few months back, even a year back, and there’s other figures who were talking about basically removing the basic right of voting for the Knesset from people who do not serve. And by the way, they mostly do differentiate between the Haredi and the Arab sector in Israel. Most of them do not demand the same from the Arab sector.

Yehuda: No. They want one to serve and they don’t want the other to serve.

Tani: They don’t want the other to serve. Again, depends who you’re talking about. Lieberman will say, of course, every 18-year-old should serve. And if they do not serve some kind of capacity of serving, it could be sherut le’umi, it could be a national service and not an army service. But then again, of course, it is anti-democratic and we have some, let’s say, illiberal components, even in the so-called liberal camp in Israel. That’s something that people shouldn’t understand. That didn’t change. Avigdor Lieberman didn’t change. He was there. He asked for, demanded loyalty from the Haredim a decade and a half ago in his political campaign.

So it is alarming. It’s not really new. The fact that Yair Lapid is doing it just shows that Lapid is looking at a way to gain more power and understands that the frustration against the Haredim. It came to a point where you need to be more, you know, blunt in what you say against them. I’m not sure that that’s the only problem that we have.

I mean, you mentioned rightfully that also the discourse about not being able to sit with basic Palestinian population, Israeli-Arab political representatives in the same coalition, which was something that we’ve just seen that happened. There’s no reason not to try to continue that. There’s also issues that would arise with regards to what do we do with Gaza? What do we do in terms of the Supreme Court? I can see if the narrative will be, let’s draft the Haredim, then a lot of other things could go and be done during that time, which will not necessarily be right for us.

Yehuda: So like what?

Tani: Like for instance, again, weakening the power of the Supreme Court. There’s a growing demand, not only on the Likud side, but also even in Yesh Atid that say, yeah, well some of the claims of those who wanted the judicial reform to happen are right, and we need maybe to support some of it, and if that’s what we need to do to be able to be in power and to get the her listed or whatever that means, that’s something that we could see going on, and then we lose even the effect of having demonstrations against it because, who, who do we protest against? It’s not the Likud is doing it. It’s some of our representatives.

So I see the vast problem here is that when we talk about this Zionist alliance, we talk about basically mostly about the Haredi issue, which is not necessarily the most burning one, and at least it’s not the only issue that we need to address.

Yehuda: Yeah, I mean, I find this piece of Israeli political life so maddening that the central civil rights struggle in this country is not about Haredim serving the army. The central civil rights struggle in this country is about Palestinians citizens, citizens of Israel, non-citizens in the West Bank, the reconstruction of Gaza. But anytime you wanna rise to power in this country, you have to look over your right shoulder. Because there’s no political gain to looking over your left shoulder, and every time that happens, it continues to drive support back to the leader of the largest right-wing party in Israel, which is Netanyahu. So that’s at least the safe version of where we have been.

Maybe you could talk a little bit about the rise of Bennett. I mean, in this country you’re never dead politically. The ultimate proof of that was Ariel Sharon. Right. In theory should have never had a political career after Sabra and Shatila—

Tani: He invented the phrase he said, when you are on the wheel, stay on the wheel. That’s his political strategy. Just stay there and hope, hopefully get back.

Yehuda: Yeah. Incredible. Bennett was also, kind of assumed that he was done. He even talked about it himself, from, retiring from politics. His numbers were tiny. I think you were skeptical of his political future, if I’m not making that up. he is now running, I think second, right? His party is now running second. And right now, and depending on how you count and depending on the polling of the day, either Netanyahu has enough seats to start off the process of building what could be essentially a replica of his current coalition. Or Bennett might have enough seats to cobble together the non-Likud right-wing parties that are not extreme right wing parties to build a different kind of a change government.

How do you explain the return of Bennett? And I guess he feels like an emblem of the same thing, which is, Bennett is not talking about any issues to his left. He’s only talking about a kind of conversation on the right. How do you see that story that’s emerged over the last couple years?

Tani: Well, I think one of the things missing, maybe, from our conversation and also general conversation in Israel, and I think that could explain some of the reasons that Bennett is back, is the word that I do not have a translation for, so maybe you’d help me: the mamlachtiut.

Yehuda: There’s no translation from.

Tani: There’s no translation from mamlachtiut.

Yehuda: Well, maybe we can say it as the background. This is an idea, I think coined by Ben Gurion of the notion of “stateness,” meaning it somehow combines the idea of statesmanship, of kind of serving the needs of the state as they are different from, your own personal needs, or maybe more importantly, your own partisan needs. Right. A commitment to the state as its own kind of commitment.

Tani: A commitment to the state and not the community. I mean, a commitment to community, which would not contradict the commitment to the state, but I think that’s one of the things that were obvious with this government, is that this government do not have any even attempt to be looked at, to be perceived as mamlachti.

They care about, first and foremost, about the different sectors who, who formed this coalition, who control this coalition, from the Haredim to the extreme religious Zionists, and also to some of the Likud’s specific factions, which you could see in a lot of items in the media that talk about the things that ministers in the Likud do for these specific moazim, they look at the voting to the Likud in those specific cities, and that’s. That’s what guides their policies.

Yehuda: Yeah. I mean, you know, that’s a good example because you don’t actually have regional representation, but you can do regional governance based on what’s good for you politically, which is the worst of both worlds.

I think maybe the best example of the lack of mamlachtiyut was not visiting shivas of mourners and not meeting with hostage families of communities—

Tani: In the communities in the Gaza strip, and also the refusal to engage with any sort of accountability around the failures of October 7th, that all of those feel like you’re really just talking about your own political survival as opposed to the interest of the state.

Tani: Right, so the accountability here is missing. And again, they do not account for the general Israeli public. That’s why also, they fight against the promotion of va’adat chakira mamlachtit, of a committee that will inquire what happened in October 7th. That’s a main policy issue in Israel, that the fact that this government should, would not even think about building, like forming a body that would inquire what happened because they’re afraid that they’ll be found guilty.

Yehuda: I wanna come back to Bennett in a minute, but how does the society tolerate that? I mean, everybody who failed on October 7th, who’s not Bibi, has had consequences, right?

Tani: Yehuda: Except for Bibi.

Yehuda: Except the guy in charge.

Tani: Not only him, the entire government, but like people that were in power, specifically him who was Prime Minister, you know, in the last two decades here, of course people see him and there’s a lot of people who left the Likud and do not support the Likud anymore because of that, who would still, if we talk about polls—and polls means something—we can still see a majority of the Israels, including coalition supporters, who say we need to form that inquiry, that committee, specific committee.

And the fact that Bennett, let’s talk about Bennett. One of the things that Bennett is pushing toward, and he sees that as a symbol for his comeback, is that the first thing—he said that just recently—the first thing that he would do as Prime Minister is to establish and to form that new va’adat chakira, inquiry committee, which again, it has to do with also tensions about the place of the Supreme Court. Should it, and would it be political enough or not political to be inquiring this government?

But we go back to a very basic notion of this government. They do not see themselves as accountable to basically anything that happens. So ministers can go and protest and demonstrate against their own government, even if they’re the government.

Yehuda: Yeah. It’s not even an argument like I would’ve fought this war any differently than Netanyahu would have. It’s not, it’s actually just about a culture of accountability and that’s maybe driving some of Bennett’s support, is that he actually shows up and he talks to constituents and he gets feedback and he visits people who are, he visits hostage families. He did all of those things in ways that the government didn’t do.

I think it’s a very complicated thing for those who don’t like, not just the personas of the Israeli government, but actually the policies of the Israeli government to see this piece of its politics emerging as the alternative without necessarily a long-term prognosis of real political change.

Now, what does that mean for your agenda when you think about issues of religious pluralism? Advancing new strategies for Judaism and State, is this society gonna be hospitable to those sorts of changes? Is it merely a question of, once I take the ultra-Orthodox parties out, I can kind of move these things along?

And I guess as context, I can say 30 years ago, I remember conversations 30 years ago where the prevailing wisdom was left and right are only divided only on the Palestinian cause, but we shared the same attitudes about who is a Jew in Judaism and state and all these things. And “if only we could solve the Palestinian issue”—I’m putting that in scare quotes—we would be able to kind of fix the Jewishness of the state of Israel within much more Democratic frameworks, but of course you could never get there because the left and right were hopelessly divided in the Palestinian cause.

Is that the same narrative again? Once I’ve sidelined the ultra-Orthodox and I’ve decided, basically, to not solve the Israeli Palestinian conflict, I might be able to get to work fixing issues of religion and state?

Tani: Well, the short answer is no. I mean, the fact that we’re polarized just pushed people from both camps into more extreme positions. I mean, you can look at what the Knesset is doing right now. The new winter session of the Knesset right after the stop of the war, or the sort of stopping of the war right now, they’re back to, again, some issues that they see their crowd as responsive to.

So members of the Likud, and I’m talking about secular members of the Likud, promoting now legislations that would force some halakhic concepts, practices on the public. There’s a law that said that every public institute should install a mezuzah right now, even if they only get some tax benefits. So the Shalom Hartman Institute, we do have mezuzot here, would have to install mezuzot.

So why do they push for those issues right now? They see the, first of all, the Haredim are not only the Haredi parties. There’s a lot of growing pressure and a lot of people who are part of the Likud right now who identify themselves as more religious, as more ultra-Orthodox, and they’re influencing and they’re causing MKs of the Likud to do those stuff.

And the other thing I would say is that, also on the other side, not due to the war, but basically due to the distrust and disbelief and what happened in the judicial overhaul, the biggest fear they had was that they would be coerced to, you know, that we will be more similar to Iran in terms of religious coercion, and they see every kind of change, every shift as a threat.

Some of those shifts are actual threats where every change in every municipality could be decide, could be determined, and could be visioned as a threat to their own way of life, their secular way of life. So right now there’s a growing distrust and it’s even harder. That’s why when we talk about the next government and we try to understand what are gonna be the best principles, the guiding principles of the next government, there is something that I think is still shared, which is decentralizing power, giving more power to municipalities, for instance, which we have seen that, were there after October 7th and are working and are doing stuff for their people and are accountable right for their people, and that’s something that we can still see support for in both side of the aisle.

Yehuda: It seems very plausible to me that if Netanyahu’s political power continues to grow and his popularity continues to grow, that we’ll see a return to the aggressive strategy of pushing forward the judicial reform.

I’ve heard stories, and I can’t describe it with any data, of soldiers coming back from the front and saying, I was fighting with the people who I fought with for a year; I don’t wanna go back to that anymore. I fear that that might lead to a weakening of the protest movement against the government and actually allow this government to do whatever it needs to do over the next year to cement its own power. How do you see the judicial reform issue playing out over the next year?

Tani: We see it that it’s back on the table again. Since we are in an election year and people are looking at the swing vote, that’s what you need to convince, right? Even if you’re in the right, far, far-right, or you’re far-left, you are looking at the swing vote, at the median of the Israeli population as the person, people, the communities that you need to convince.

I agree that the demonstrations are weakened right now, specifically, by the way, since the captives the were back. Not everyone’s still back and we hope that the last one will be back, even the, even the dead ones. But I think that demonstrations had weakened already. I think the government is working tirelessly at weakening the legitimacy of organizations that fought against the judicial overhaul.

But again, on the other side, we do see that people from the coalition understood. And since basically right now the Haredi are not in the coalition, they have less power to do it. They saw that their fight against the Supreme Court has good vibes, maybe, in their communities and in their constituency, but it also caused a lot of damage to the more moderate, maybe potential Likud voters, which stepped away and do not support the Likud right now, which they wanna bring back.

So, I mean, we are there. We are seeing that some of the Likud members and some of the more, let’s say, religious Zionist members of the Knessrt are trying to push for some components of their judicial overhaul, but I’m not sure that that will be the biggest threat. I think we are looking at a bigger threat, which is delegitimizing, I mean, communities in the Israeli society like we’ve talked about before, and weakening the even possibility of having a free election here. That’s our biggest threat right now.

Yehuda: Can I ask you a weird question about Bibi? Which is—

Tani: Go for it.

Yehuda: You know, one of the things that’s so striking to me is that the narrative out in the world is that Trump comes in, and essentially forces the agreement on the table again, you know, against what Bibi wants to do. Now, I don’t totally believe that, because one of the things that Bibi did very effectively for 20 years was fend off criticism from his right by saying, what can I do? The Americans are making me do it. And I wonder whether that happened here, whether Bibi was like, I kind of wanna end the war. I can’t, ’cause I’ll lose my government. I’ll let Trump take all the accolades and I’ll pretend that I’m being coerced.

So number one, do you think that’s a crazy conspiracy theory? And the second is, why did that help Bibi? Because if the public narrative was, Trump did this over Bibi’s interests, now if ever Israel was a vassal state of America, it’s become pretty obvious as you have American troops on the ground, why does this at all help Bibi? It kind of takes away his whole self narrative as being Israel’s protector, you know, with the whole story of if America even won’t be with us, we’ll go at it alone. The whole thing’s like kind of incomprehensible,

Tani: Well, first of all, I don’t think it’s a crazy theory.

Yehuda: Great.

Tani: I mean, has, it has, it has something. People are talking about Ron Dermer doing, you know, what he needs to be doing to get the message to the Americans that we are prepared for it. Let’s say that I think he wanted to go to an agreement and he couldn’t do it with this coalition, and he needed someone to force it on him to be looked at as something that is being enforced.

I think two things about Netanyahu right now. One is that his main goal is to just to remain Prime Minister as long as he can and to keep on going ever until, I mean, to get this government to fill its days and to finish with any kind of other achievements that he could. And he sees the end of the war as a leading point to maybe getting some treaties of the Abraham Accords or other stuff that are consensus in Israel right now. That’s first.

The second is in Israel right now. I don’t if people understand that, but Trump is not looked at as someone from the outside who would force policies in Israel. He is one of the most popular people in Israel from both sides. You needed to look at the Knesset—when he came over the entire plenum, except for maybe some members of the Arab parties stood up and applauded. And Yair Lapid, the head of the opposition, I mean, his speech was so welcoming, so, so warm again, for someone who would, if has been seen as not really taking care of some of the liberal issues, because he’s right now calling the shots and that’s okay for everyone.

So the fact that Netanyahu brought him or not bring him, or maybe was forced to to go to that deal did not hurt Netanyahu. The opposite. It helps Netanyahu to go where he needs to go.

Yehuda: It’s so weird. The funniest part of that speech, obviously, when he was like, Hey, this Yair Lapid guy, he’s pretty good.

Tani: Yeah, I didn’t know that he was pretty good, but right now when he kissed up properly, now we know that.

Yehuda: It’s unbelievable.

Alright, let me ask you one last question, which is, let’s say this all goes according to plan. Looks like an opposition government can actually get elected on October 27th, 2026. The elections proceed as they’re supposed to. The judicial reform does not succeed at actually doing what it needs to do, and we proceed to elections.

Naftali Bennett, presumably, is the winning, the leader of that opposition. Three pieces of legislation that you would wanna see advanced out of the Center, that you’re working on and that you’re writing, that could be part of that new agenda and could have a realistic chance of being part of a future Israel and a different kind of Zionist consensus.

Tani: Well, that’s very hopeful. But I think one of the things that we have learned from the change government, and again, the center was established during the time, the change government, not as a response to the change government, but we actually learned a lot of things from working with that government, is that you need to be well prepared and you need to know that it’s a very short window of opportunity. You won’t have enough time to do, like, everything that you need to do.

Yehuda: Let me just explain for our listeners, right, because all of government public policy for the duration of the time that they’re in power is basically baked into the coalition agreements. So if Party A says, we need these pieces of legislation passed, it’s part of what they negotiate with the ruling party in order to be part of that government. So it’s no surprises later on. So go ahead.

Tani: Right, and you would add that what you can do and you won’t do in the first year of the government and the coalition, you won’t be able to do it all. Maybe you know, small changes and we are not talking about small changes.

And another thing that we have understood that we need—if we can say that that’s a thing in policy—irreversible changes, I mean things that would not be reversed easily. And that has to do with structures, because right now we have a lot of structures which would basically, are causing us to not be able to get more budgets to pluralistic agenda, to pluralistic communities, to liberal shuls and synagogues and so forth.

So one of the things that we’re looking at, I’ve been talking about that before, is decentralizing a lot of powers in a lot of other policy issues, but specifically also in Judaism and state issues, when looking at the fact that we have bodies who are in the municipalities determining who would get the religious services and what capacity and how many budgets you would have, that’s something that we cannot go for, and decentralizing powers to municipalities for choosing their own rabbis, for allocating their own resources and budgets, but getting the support from the government, for getting people wedded, even, that’s something that we are looking at. I think that’s a possibility to do in the next government if we have that window of opportunity.

Another thing is to talk about issues of personal status like religion, religious state. I’m talking about specifically marriage and divorce, but also burial issues. Something that should be inclusive. I mean, we will not be able to dismantle the Rabbanut. The Rabbanut will stay, probably, but we need to open more chances and more recognitions of other routes and other alternatives to the Rabbanut.

And I think since we have on ground right now what we didn’t have at 2013 when I worked in the Knesset and there was a window of opportunity and people said, let’s do stuff, we have alternatives on ground, who are getting people to get married outside of their Rabbanut, who are doing a lot of other issues, giving Kashrut certificates. We need to give them more power to recognize them and to accommodate them with governmental budgets.

So those are two main issues that are basically broad, in the sense of, we can look at it in different kinds of versions. Those are issues that we’re looking at for the next government.

Yehuda: Decentralization and market capitalism as applies to religion. Hallmarks of liberalism. That’s what we do, right? Yep.

Tani: That’s what we attempt at doing.

Yehuda: Tani, thanks for being on the show. God willing things will go according to plan. Thanks for being here.

Tani: Thank you.